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LITIGATING FOR LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS:
A LEGAL HISTORY
Patricia A. Cain*
INTRODUCTION( AY rights cases have never been at the forefront of the legal
academy. For example, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,I the constitutional rights of gay men and lesbians
were typically omitted from coverage in constitutional law classes.
Even today, some constitutional law teachers continue to omit cover-
age of lesbian and gay rights issues.
The rights of lesbians and gay men were not totally ignored by pre-
Hardwick legal scholars, however. Several constitutional scholars
discussed the potential equal protection and due process claims of les-
bian and gay litigants. 2 Rarely, however, did these legal scholars
make lesbians and gay men the primary focal point of their work.
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. I would like to thank my friends at Lambda Legal
Defense and the Gay and Lesbian Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union for
their ongoing conversations regarding lesbian and gay rights litigation. For comments on an
earlier draft of this Article, I thank Nan Hunter, Mary Anne Case, and especially Jean Love.
An even earlier draft of this Article was presented to a faculty seminar at the University of
Nebraska Law School, and I thank those participants. Research assistance was provided by
Jill Altman and Paul Dietsch.
1 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2 See, e.g., John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 162-64 (1980) (discussing equal protection
analysis); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 944-45 (1978) (discussing equal
protection analysis); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 131, 135 (1981)
(questioning the constitutionality of sodomy laws pursuant to an equal protection analysis);
Kenneth L. Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 658, 682-86 (1980);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 62 (1977) (criticizing summary affirmance in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)); J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward
White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyle, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 563, 587-600
(1977).
3 A few legal scholars are notable exceptions to this statement. The most notable are
Rhonda Rivera, Josh Dressler, and David Richards. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Book Review,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 391 (1984) (reviewing John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities:
The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (1983)); Rhonda R.
Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 Drake L. Rev. 311 (1980-81);
Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in
the United States, 30 Hastings L.J. 799 (1979); Joshua Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: Gay
1551
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Once Hardwick was being litigated, lesbian and gay legal scholarship
increased significantly.4
Thus, to many in the legal academy, gay rights litigation appears to
have begun with Hardwick. Yet that perception is not consistent with
reality. A major purpose of this Article is to describe the broader
history of gay rights litigation so that Hardwick can be seen in its
proper context.
Legal scholars are not alone in their misperceptions. Outside of the
legal academy, there is a strong perception that the gay rights move-
ment began with the Stonewall Riots in 1969. Although that event
was certainly a turning point, a significant gay rights movement
existed before that time. Thus, this Article will also cover the legal
and social history that preceded Stonewall.
This Article is primarily a legal history of gay rights litigation and
the gay rights movement. Relying on the work of other scholars, in
particular gay historians Jonathan Katz, 5 Martin Duberman, 6 Lillian
Rights Biggest Roadblock, Civ. Liberties Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 19; Joshua Dressier, Study of
Law Student Attitudes Regarding the Rights of Gay People to Be Teachers, 4 J.
Homosexuality 315 (1979); Joshua Dressier, Gay Teachers: A Disesteemed Minority in an
Overly Esteemed Profession, 9 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 399 (1978); David A.J. Richards, Sexual
Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the
Unwritten Constitution, 30 Hastings L.J. 957 (1979); David A.J. Richards, Unnatural Acts
and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1281 (1977).
Family law scholars also wrote about lesbian and gay issues pre-Hardwick, in particular
about lesbian custody. See, e.g., Donna IHitchens & Barbara Price, Trial Strategy in Lesbian
Mother Custody Cases: The Use of Expert Testimony, 9 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 451 (1978-
79).
4 See generally the publications noted as lesbian- and gay-related in Professor Arthur
Leonard's monthly newsletter, Lesbian/Gay Law Notes. The Association of American Law
Schools Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues publishes in its newsletter a partial
bibliography from Professor Leonard's fies. The May to October 1991 Bibliography listed 68
books and articles and 49 student notes and comments. See AALS Section on Gay and Lesbian
Legal Issues, Newsletter 6-8 (Fall 1991). In addition, there is now a student-edited law journal
that focus on lesbian and gay issues: Law and Sexuality, published by students at Tulane Law
School. Similar student-edited journals are in the planning stages at other law schools.
5 Jonathon Katz, Gay American History (rev. ed. 1992).
6 Martin Duberman, Stonewall (1993).
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Faderman,7 Barry Adam," Randy Shilts,9 Eric Marcus,1" and John
D'Emilio,11 I have attempted to contextualize some of the more
famous pre-Hardwick gay rights cases by describing the social and
legal conditions existing at the time. I have chosen to focus on litiga-
tion that affects public sphere rights as opposed to litigation about
private relationships and family issues, because Hardwick, as a practi-
cal matter, more directly affects public sphere rights such as employ-
ment and citizenship. 12
Although this Article is primarily intended as a legal history of pre-
Hardwick litigation, I conclude in the last Part with some observa-
tions regarding post-Hardwick litigation strategies. I focus primarily
on public-employment cases in which litigators have stressed equal
protection arguments to remedy cases of class-based discrimination.
Many of these cases rely on what I consider to be an artificial bifurca-
tion of status and conduct. In the last Part of this Article, I critique
the status versus conduct distinction and argue that, despite Hard-
wick, litigators should continue making substantive due process argu-
ments that focus on lesbian and gay conduct. I believe such
arguments are necessary to challenge the Hardwick holding, and fur-
thermore, that such arguments more accurately reflect the reality of
lesbian and gay lives.
7 Lillian Faderman, Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life in Twentieth
Century America (1991).
8 Barry D Adam, The Rise of a Gay and Lesbian Movement (1987).
9 Randy Shilts, Conduct Unbecoming: Lesbians and Gays in the U.S. Military, Vietnam to
the Persian Gulf (1993).
10 Eric Marcus, Making History: The Struggle for Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights, 1945-
1990 (1992).
11 John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities (1983) [hereinafter D'Emilio, Sexual
Politics]; John D'Emilio, Making Trouble (1992) [hereinafter D'Emilio, Making Trouble].
12 This is not to say that Hardwick has no effect on private sphere rights. The sodomy
statutes left standing by the Court's due process holding in Hardwick have been used to deny
custody to gay and lesbian parents. See, e.g, Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985), cited with
approval in a recent lesbian mother case, Bottoms v. Bottoms, decided by the Henrico County,
Virginia, Circuit Court in September, 1993. See Lesbian Loses Custody of Her Son to Her
Mother, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1993, at A17. The Times quotes Judge Buford M. Parsons, Jr.,
as follows: "The [lesbian] mother's conduct is illegal and immoral and renders her an unfit
parent." Id.
Despite Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that custody decisions based on
racial prejudice are unconstitutional), family law cases are rarely argued in constitutional
terms. By contrast, state decisions regarding government employment and other public sphere
rights pose clear constitutional issues similar to the issues in Hardwick.
1993] 1553
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I. GAY RIGHTS BEFORE STONEWALL
A. Early Beginnings and the Conspiracy of Silence
The first authentically pro-gay civil rights organization was formed
in Germany in 1897.13 The goals of the Scientific-Humanitarian
Committee (Wissenschaftlich-Humanitfires Komitee) were to fight for
repeal of anti-gay provisions in the German penal code, to promote
public education about homosexuality, and to encourage homosexuals
to organize for their rights.14 Underlying the group's political philos-
ophy was the theory that homosexuals were a "third sex"1" deter-
mined at birth. 6 Although support for this theory was not universal
among members of the German movement, many thought it would
strengthen their arguments against persecution if they could present
their homosexuality as a characteristic determined at birth rather
than as a choice. 17 The "third sex" perspective was endorsed by a
small number of German medical doctors, thereby lending credence
to the claim.
The German organization's influence made its way across the
Atlantic to the United States. As early as 1906, members of the Sci-
entific-Humanitarian Committee lectured in New York.", In 1907, a
member of the Committee, Dr. Georg Merzbach, reported on his lec-
ture to the New York Society of Medical Jurisprudence by writing to
a colleague back in Germany: "I had expected ... a courteous but
cool reception because of the subject matter; and now we have had
this singular success in the very country where bigotry and prudish-
13 Adam, supra note 8, at 17; Marcus, supra note 10 at 1.
14 Marcus, supra note 10, at 1. For an historical explanation of why this organization was
able to campaign successfully despite the fact that male homosexuality was illegal, see David
F. Greenberg, The Construction of Homosexuality 410 (1988). Of prime importance was the
fact that gay bars were tolerated, thereby creating space for socialization and political
mobilization. Gay bars have played a significant role in gay political mobilization in the
United States as well. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
15 The phrase "third sex" can be traced to Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, who argued that
homosexuality was a congenital condition. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 408.
16 See Adam, supra note 8, at 18.
17 The same debate over the innateness of homosexuality continues today. The debate often
breaks down along gender lines with lesbians supporting the notion of choice and gay men
supporting innateness. In turn of the century Germany, the opposition to the congenital
"third sex" theory came primarily from antifeminist gay men who viewed homosexuality as an
expression of male superiority. Greenberg, supra note 14 at 410.
18 See Katz, supra note 5, at 381-82 (reproducing accounts of the presentations).
1554 [Vol. 79:1551
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ness are truly at home."'19 Unlike the medical community in Ger-
many, however, American doctors more readily embraced the
"degeneracy" theory of homosexuality. 20 Although degeneracy the-
ory, like the German theories, was based on the notion that homosex-
uality could be inherited, the theory also emphasized the depravity of
the condition and the fact that homosexuality could remain latent
until triggered. This "disease" theory led medical doctors to support
such treatment as aversion therapy, castration, and other radical
"cures," rather than decriminalization.2'
The first American to speak publicly in support of same-sex love
was Emma Goldman, the famous anarchist and feminist. 22 Although
Goldman is better known as a defender of free speech, birth control,
pacifism, and the rights of workers, her position on same-sex love was
an integral part of her general philosophy of free love.23 In addition
to her public speeches on the topic, Goldman also wrote about the
plight of homosexuals, relying on the accounts of lesbians she met in
prison, as well as the writings of Magnus Hirschfeld and others.24 As
a consequence of her more radical beliefs, Emma Goldman was
denaturalized and deported during the "Red Scare" of 1919-1920.2s
The first known gay rights organization in the United States was
the Society for Human Rights ("SHR"), founded in Chicago in 1924
19 Letter from George Merzbach to Magnus Hirschfeld, reprinted in Katz, supra note 5, at
382.
20 See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 15.
21 For information about the medicalization of homosexuality, see D'Emilio, Sexual
Politics, supra note 11, at 15; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 397-433; Katz, supra note 5, at 129-
207.
22 Dr. Magnus Hirschfield, head of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, identified
Emma Goldman as the first Amercian "to take up the defense of homosexual love before the
general public." Katz, supra note 5, at 378.
23 See Emma Goldman, Living My Life, 555-56 (AMS Press 1970) (1934) (discussing her
lectures).
24 Adam, supra note 8, at 41. Lesbian historian Lillian Faderman provides several excerpts
from erotic letters Goldman received from a female friend with whom she vacationed. Despite
this evidence of an erotic relationship with another woman, Goldman did not identify as a
lesbian and distanced herself from other lesbians, whom she described as manhaters.
Faderman, supra note 7, at 33-34 (quoting Nowhere at Home: Letters from Exile of Emma
Goldman and Alexander Berkman 86 (Richard and Anna Maria Drinnan eds., 1975)).
25 Adam, supra note 8, at 43; Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties 44 (1990).
J. Edgar Hoover is reported to have personally masterminded the case against Goldman and
her lover, Alexander Berkman, who was deported with her. See Nancy Caldwell Sorel, J.
Edgar Hoover & Emma Goldman, The Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 1993, at 105.
1993] 1555
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by Henry Gerber, a German-American.2 6 The organization was
formed for the following purposes:
[T]o promote and to protect the interests of people who by reasons of
mental and physical abnormalities are abused and hindered in the
legal pursuit of happiness which is guaranteed them by the Declara-
tion of Independence, and to combat the public prejudices against
them by dissemination of facts according to modem science among
intellectuals of mature age.27
The organization was short-lived.28 It published two issues of a
publication entitled Friendship and Freedom, but was unable to con-
tinue. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that it was difficult
to "get men of good reputation to back up the Society. '29 Gerber
attributes this difficulty to the reluctance of reputable persons to asso-
ciate with presumed criminals such as homosexuals.3 0 The organiza-
tion fell apart when the wife of one of the members reported the group
to the Chicago police. Several of the members, including Gerber,
were arrested and jailed. The specific charges were never made clear
to the defendants and the case was ultimately dismissed on the
grounds that no warrant had ever been issued. From Gerber's per-
spective, they had been charged solely with the crime of being homo-
sexual.3 1  The tenor of the times is illustrated by the Chicago
Examiner headline: "Strange Sex Cult Exposed." 32
The short life of this first American gay-rights organization should
come as no surprise. Repression was standard practice at the end of
World War 1. 3 Although the "Red Scare" (which occurred roughly
in 1919-20) focused on union and communist sympathizers, many
others were caught up in this effort to repress anything perceived as
26 Warren J. Blumenfeld & Diane Raymond, Looking at Gay and Lesbian Life 288 (1988);
Katz, supra note 5, at 385-89.
27 See Katz, supra note 5, at 387 (reproducing the Charter of Society for Human Rights).
28 A detailed account of the organization's history, written by Gerber, was published in a
1962 issue of "One" magazine. See Henry Gerber, The Society for Human Rights-1925, One
Mag., Sept. 1962, at 5, reprinted in Katz, supra note 5, at 388-93.
29 Id. at 389.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 391.
33 The ACLU, founded on January 19, 1920, as a spin-off of Roger Baldwin's National Civil
Liberties Bureau, stated in its first annual report: "Never before in American history were the
forces of reaction so completely in control of our political and economic life." Walker, supra
note 25, at 47, 51-52.
1556 [Vol. 79:1551
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"un-American. ' ' a4  Emma Goldman, branded as a "red," was
deported, along with other "reds," to the Soviet Union.3 5 Henry
Gerber, the founder of SHR, was dismissed by the federal government
from his job with the United States Post Office. 36 Foreign books, con-
taining "dangerous ideas," were banned by the Treasury Department,
the "dangerous ideas" including sex and sexuality. In fact, the most
famous lesbian novel in the English language, The Well of Loneli-
ness,37 was one of the 739 books on the U.S. Customs list of banned
books.3 8
The post-World War I era in America was thus a time of censor-
ship, especially with respect to the topic of sex.39 Although lesbian
34 See generally Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedoms 119-45 (1963)
(discussing the breadth of deportation activities during the Red Scare). The association of
sexual perversion and communism was prevalent in the McCarthy era as well. See D'Emilio,
Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 41-49; infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
35 See Walker, supra note 25, at 44.
36 Gerber, supra note 28, reprinted in Katz, supra note 5, at 392.
37 Radclyffe Hall, The Well of Loneliness (1928). The novel was believed by many to be
obscene. Alfred Knopf declined to publish it in the United States after receiving legal advice
that he might be prosecuted. Convici-Friede of New York published the book instead. Katz,
supra note 5, at 398. Shortly thereafter, Friede was prosecuted. See People v. Friede, 233
N.Y.S. 565, 568 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1929), applying the English test for obscenity set forth in
Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360, 371 (1868), which asked whether the material tended to
corrupt the morally weak. In refusing to dismiss the complaint the court stated:
The book can have no moral value, since it seeks to justify the right of a pervert to prey
upon normal members of a community, and to uphold such relationships as noble and
lofty. Although it pleads for tolerance on the part of society of those possessed of and
inflicted with perverted traits and tendencies, it does not argue for repression or
moderation of insidious impulses.
Friede, 233 N.Y.S. at 567.
Two months later a three judge panel in Special Sessions reversed the Magistrate's finding
on obscenity and dimissed the charges against Friede. There is no official legal report of this
opinion, but it is noted in the New York Times. See "Well of Loneliness" Cleared in Court
Here, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1929, at 20 reprinted in Katz, supra note 5, at 399. See also People
v. London, 63 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230 (1946) (observing that the Court of Special Sessions reversed
the Magistrate's decision on the Well of Loneliness).
38 Walker, supra note 25, at 59.
39 See generally Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of
Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew,
33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 741, 768-82 (1992) (describing censorship during the 1920s in the
print media and in film). The Motion Pictures Production Code, set up in the early 1930s,
contributed to the censorship of expressions of sexuality in film. The openly lesbian camp of
actors such as Marlene Dietrich and Mae West began to disappear from the screen in the
1930s. See Lewis Beale, Gays vs. Hollywood: 'Basic Instinct' Fuels the Old Debate on
Stereotypes, Chi. Trib., Mar. 29, 1992, § 13, at 10-11. See generally Stephen Vaughn, Morality
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  1557 1993
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and gay subcultures existed during this period,' hostility toward "dif-
ference" prevented the formation of any widespread gay or lesbian
movement against anti-gay discrimination.4 1
B. The Homophile Movement: Becoming Visible
After World War II, a number of homophile42 organizations began
to spring up around the country. The Mattachine Society43 was
formed in Los Angeles around 1950. 4 Its principal organizers were
Harry Hay, Chuck Rowland, Bob Hull, Rudi Gernreich, and Dale
Jennings.45 The repressive climate of the early 1950s, especially the
attacks on communists and other radicals, led these organizers to opt
for secrecy in their organizing tactics. 46 But they never kept the mis-
sion of their organization secret: to liberate the homosexual minority
and Entertainment: The Origins of the Motion Picture Production Code, 77 J. Am. Hist. 39
(1990) (discussing the origins of the Production Code and its eventual decline).
40 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 11-13.
41 The stock market crash of 1929 and prohibition also contributed to the decline of gay and
lesbian subcultures, particularly that of the Harlem Renaissance. See Eric Garber, A Spectacle
in Color: The Lesbian and Gay Subculture of Jazz Age Harlem, in Hidden from History:
Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past 319 (Martin Duberman, Martha Vicinus, & George
Chouncey, Jr., eds., 1989).
42 Harry Hay, a co-founder of the Mattachine Society, claims that he embraced
"homophile" as the movement's desriptive adjective of choice because straight society had
loaded so much negative baggage on the word "homosexual." "Homophile" means lover of
same. See Andrea Weiss & Greta Schiller, Before Stonewall: The Making of a Gay and Lesbian
Community 40-41 (1988).
43 The name of "Mattachine" was borrowed from secret medieval societies of unmarried
men who, while wearing masks, conducted rituals during the Feast of Fools, often as protests
against oppression. Harry Hay suggested the name to signify that gay people in the 1950s were
masked and unknown figures, fighting for social change. See Katz, supra note 5, at 412-13
(reproducing an interview with Harry Hay).
44 A complete history of the formation of the Mattachine Society is reported by John
D'Emilio. See D'Emilio, Making Trouble, supra note 11, at 17-56; see also Katz, supra note 5,
at 406-20 (reproducing Henry Hay's account of the founding of the Mattachine Society). The
five founders met in November 1950. Two more founders joined them in early 1951 and an
outline of the organization's goals and puproses was reduced to writing in April 1951; the
society was incorporated shortly thereafter. See D'Emilio, Making Trouble, supra note 11, at
28; Katz, supra note 5, at 411-12; Marcus, supra note 10, at 54-58 (reproducing an interview
with Herb Selwyn).
45 Marcus, supra note 10, at 32 (reproducing an interview with Chuck Rowland). These
five original founders invited James Gruber and Konrad Stevens to join then in early 1951.
Gruber and Stevens helped draft the original founding documents. D'Emilio, Making
Trouble, supra note 11, at 28.
46 D'Emilio, Making Trouble, supra note 11, at 18. Of the five original founders, at least
three had been members of the Communist Party. Id. at 18.
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  1558 1993
Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights
from the oppression of the majority and to call on other minorities to
fight with them against oppression.47
The first legal case backed by Mattachine involved one of its foun-
ders, Dale Jennings, who had been arrested for lewd behavior in a Los
Angeles public park. The charges arose from an incident fairly
described as entrapment. 4 The trial, which began in June of 1952,
was historically significant because it was one of the first times that a
gay man had been willing to stand up in court and say, "Yes, I am
gay, but I nonetheless have legal rights." The trial ended in a hung
jury, which, given the attitudes of the times, was a clear victory for
gay rights.4 9 Shortly thereafter, the District Attorney dropped all
charges.50
Members of the Mattachine Society put out a magazine entitled
"One,"'5 1 the publication of which was subsequently taken over by an
independent organization called One, Inc. Jim Kepner, a journalist
who wrote for "One," reports that early editions contained such items
as a lesbian-authored poem entitled "Proud and Unashamed," an
essay of his entitled "The Importance of Being Honest," and news
reports of gay witch-hunts in Britain and Miami.52 The magazine's
stated purpose was to deal with homosexuality from a scientific, his-
torical, and critical point of view. Nonetheless, the Post Office confis-
cated the October 1954 issue of the magazine and refused to mail it on
grounds that it was obscene. Jim Kepner hypothesizes that the Octo-
ber issue was confiscated on directions from J. Edgar Hoover because
Hoover had been accused in the prior issue of "One" of sleeping with
Clyde Tolson, his driver and bodyguard.5 3 In response to the confis-
cation, One, Inc., brought suit in federal court, claiming First
Amendment protection for its published speech, an abuse of discre-
tion by the postmaster of Los Angeles, violation of equal protection,
and a deprivation of property without due process. The magazine lost
47 Katz, supra note 5, at 412.
48 D'Emilio, Making Trouble, supra note 11, at 30-31.
49 Id. at 33.
5o Id.
51 Id. at 34-35. The name is derived from a Thomas Carlyle line: "A mystic bond of
brotherhood makes all men one." Id.
52 Marcus, supra note 10, at 47, 50 (reproducing an interview with Jim Kepner).
53 Marcus, supra note 10, at 52 (reproducing an interview with Jim Kepner).
1993] 1559
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at both the trial and appellate levels.5 4 But the case was reversed by
the Supreme Court in a brief 1958 per curiam opinion, One, Inc. v.
Olesen, that merely cited Roth v. United States.5 6
The per curiam opinion in One, Inc. left open for debate whether a
finding of obscenity should be treated as a question of fact or as an
independently reviewable question of law. 7  The Supreme Court
finally answered this question in New York Times v. Sullivan,58 citing
One, Inc. and noting that independent review by appellate courts was
appropriate when First Amendment rights were implicated. 9
54 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that the magazine contained
obscene material), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 371 (1958). The supposedly obscene material
included a lesbian story entitled "Saphho Remembered" in which a 20-year-old woman
struggles to choose between a life with her lesbian lover and married life with her childhood
sweetheart and a poem about Lord Montagu, the content of which is described as vulgar
although no specific quotes are given. Id. at 777.
55 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam). In reversing, the Court stated the following: "The
petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476." Id.
56 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth did not involve homosexual material and the convictions in
Roth were upheld. Nonetheless, Roth is a watershed case for First Amendment law because it
announced a clear abandonment of the Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868), test for
obscenity. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-90; supra note 37.
Under Roth, material was to be classified as obscene (and thus lose its First Amendment
protection) only if an average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The Roth test departed from the old English test in three major ways:
(1) the focus was shifted to the material's effect on average readers rather than the "morally
weak"; (2) evaluation was to be made according to contemporary standards rather than
obsolete moral standards; (3) the entire work was to be considered, rather than isolated
portions of the work.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Darnell, 316 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1962) (Moore, J., dissenting)
(questioning majority opinion upholding conviction resulting from truly private mail
correspondence and citing to reversal in One, Inc. as evidence that the Supreme Court had
ruled on the merits of homosexual expression), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 916 (1963); Ackerman v.
United States, 293 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1961) (maintaining that One, Inc was only about
the legal test for obscenity, but nonetheless distinguishing the Ackerman facts from the facts in
One, Inc.); Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254, 261 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (reversing as a
"matter of law" a post office official's determination that an article by gay writer William S.
Burroughs entitled "Ten Episodes from Naked Lunch" was obscene).
58 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59 Id. at 285. Sullivan held that allegedly libelous statements are subject to certain First
Amendment protections. Id. at 292.
1560
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Although the founding members of the Mattachine Society were all
men, a few women became members over the years.' Apparently, the
San Francisco branch was more successful than Los Angeles in
61attracting women. 1 In 1955, Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon formed
the first lesbian organization, the Daughters of Bilitis ("DOB"), in
San Francisco. 62 At the time, they knew nothing of the Mattachine
Society's existencee, 63 despite its relative success in attracting San
Franciso women and the fact that Hal Call of San Francisco had
taken control of the organization in 1953. 64
Chapters of Mattachine and DOB sprang up around the country
during the late 1950s and early 1960s.65 Neither organization was
particularly radical during this era. When Hal Call took over Mat-
tachine in 1953, he rejected the philosophy of its more radical foun-
ders.66 Rather than participate in public protests over the injustices
perpetrated against homosexuals, Call preferred to cooperate with
educators and researchers to prove that homosexuals were no differ-
ent from other people. 67 DOB's agenda was similar. The organiza-
tion began as a social group to provide meeting spaces away from
bars, but it also held educational events at which lawyers and psycha-
trists would speak to the members.68
In 1961, the homophile movement took a turn toward militant
activism when Frank Kameny formed the Mattachine Society of
Washington, D.C., as a last recourse in his legal battle to keep his job
with the federal government, a job he lost solely because he was gay.69
By that time, the Mattachine Society's national structure had col-
60 Faderman, supra note 7, at 190; see also Marcus, supra note 10, at 47 (noting that Jim
Kepner reported that a lesbian friend took him to his first Mattachine Society meeting in
1952).
61 See Faderman, supra note 7, at 190. But see Marcus, supra note 10, at 61 (reproducing
an interview with Hal Call who claims that, in the early days, "the women weren't in it").
62 Faderman, supra note 7, at 190.
63 Id.
64 Marcus, supra note 10, at 59.
65 For information about the formation of Mattachine chapters in New York, Boston,
Denver, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., and of DOB chapters in New
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, see D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 115-18.
66 Marcus, supra note 10, at 62 (reproducing an interview with Hal Call).
67 Id. at 63.
68 Faderman, supra note 7, at 190-91.
69 See Marcus, supra note 10, at 93-103 (reproducing an interview with Frank Kameny);
infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
1993] 1561
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  1561 1993
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 79:1551
lapsed,70 leaving local groups free to make their own policy decisions.
Some chapters, including those in Boston and Denver, folded when
they lost the support of a national organization. 71 However, the more
militant east coast groups, influenced in large part by Kameny's activ-
ism, thrived. Frank Kameny's decision to stand up to the federal gov-
ernment and fight for his rights forever changed the focus of
homophile organizations.72
Kameny's militant stand in favor of the right of homosexuals to
keep their jobs attracted the attention of Barbara Gittings, founder
and president of the New York chapter of DOB.73  They worked
together in the East Coast Homophile Organizations ("ECHO"), an
umbrella group made up of the New York DOB chapter and the Mat-
tachine groups from New York, Washington, D.C., and
Philadelphia.7'
In the mid 1960s, Kameny, Gittings, and other militants took the
position that ECHO members should engage in picketing activities
calling for recognition of gay rights. DOB's national board rejected
this position and directed the New York chapter to withdraw from
ECHO. 75 ECHO members, led by Frank Kameny, demonstrated in
front of the White House, the men conservatively attired in suits and
70 Hal Call persuaded a majority of the board to disband the national organization in March
1961, primarily in response to the heated rivalry between the San Francisco and New York
chapters. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 123. Kameny formed the Washington,
D.C., group the following November. Id. at 152.
71 Id. at 123.
72 See Shilts, supra note 9, at 194 (describing Kameny's early political activity, and
enumerating his goals for the Washington, D.C., chapter of the Mattachine Society). D'Emilio
reports that Kameny was instrumental in forming East Coast Homophile Organizations
("ECHO"), a coalition of east coast organizations, which helped to solidify the more militant
wing of the movement. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 161. In 1966, the North
American Conference of Homophile Organizations ("NACHO") was formed. Id. at 197.
Through NACHO, organizations formed a national legal fund to help finance court cases. Id.
73 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 169-70.
74 See Duberman, supra note 6, at 102. The Philadelphia Mattachine Society had renamed
itself the Janus Society after the national Mattachine organization disintegrated. The
"branches" of Mattachine that existed around the country at that time became independent
organizations as a result of the collapse of Mattachine's national structure. Id. DOB,
however, remained a national organization in which the national board retained some control
over policy decisions made by local chapters. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at
171.
75 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 171-72.
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the women in skirts.76 Kameny's militancy, which so angered the old
guard lesbians and gay men, was nonetheless tempered by his demand
for respectability.77 Kameny's main contribution to the movement
was to shift efforts away from education and pleas for tolerance and
understanding in favor of strategies that boldly asserted the worth of
homosexual people as citizens.
While Frank Kameny and his East Coast coalition of militant
homophile organizations were becoming more aggressive in their fight
for equal rights, a new group was being formed on the West Coast,
with similarly militant inclinations. The Society for Individual Rights
("SIR") was formed in San Francisco in 1964 and quickly became the
largest pre-Stonewall gay rights organization in the country.7 Martin
Duberman reports that the membership of SIR had reached 1000 by
1966.79 SIR was more political than the San Francisco Mattachine
Society. For example, in its early days SIR attempted to hold candi-
date forums to illustrate the power of gay voters, although most can-
didates were unwilling to participate.80 SIR's first major legal battle
resulted from police arrests made at the New Year's Day ball of Janu-
ary 1, 1965, an event sponsored by the Council on Religion and the
Homosexual ("CRH"). The organization's lawyers were arrested,81
76 Duberman, supra note 6, at 111-12. There is a photograph of the picketers in front of the
White House included in the collection of photographs in the middle of the book.
77 Id. On the concept of "militant respectability" and the role played by militant lesbians
and gay men in the Philadelphia lesbian and gay organizations, see Mark Stein, Sex, Politics,
and the Lesbian/Gay Movement: Cooperation and Conflict in 1960's Philadelphia, (paper
presented on a panel entitled "Gay Politics in the 1960s" at a conference, "Toward a History
of the 1960s" in Madison, Wisconsin, May 1, 1993) (on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association). Stein describes the Philadelphia organizations of the 1960s, Janus and
Mattachine, as adhering to gender norms and adopting accommodationist strategies that
effected the exclusion of gender crossers. Public cooperation between lesbians and gay men
was thought to create an image of respectability that could not have been attained by sex
segregated strategies. Id.
78 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 190-91.
79 Duberman, supra note 6, at 99.
8o Marcus, supra note 10, at 140 (reproducing an interview with Nancy May, one of the
founders of SIR). In its early days, Mattachine had also interjected itself into political
campaigns by sending questionnaires to candidates. It was this activity that caught the
attention of journalist Paul Coates and led to public questioning of Mattachine's secret
organizational structure, a questioning that ultimately led to the democratization and
deradicalization of Mattachine. See D'Emilo, Making Trouble, supra note 11, at 38-45.
s The two principal lawyers were Herbert Donaldson and Evander Smith. Donaldson was
later appointed by Governor Jerry Brown as the first openly gay municipal court judge in
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along with Nancy May,8 2 on grounds that they obstructed the police
from entering the premises. The charges were ultimately dismissed at
trial on the technical grounds that the police had in fact entered the
premises before making the arrests, but, more importantly, the result-
ing publicity of the event and the new willingness of people to stand
up in support of lesbian and gay rights created a turning point for gay
rights organizations on the West Coast.8 3
All of these pre-Stonewall organizations were grass-roots organiza-
tions of gay men and lesbians. Although some homophile organiza-
tions focused more on civil rights issues than others, none of them
were specifically legal organizations. In addition, those organizations
that did focus on civil rights issues nonetheless adopted assimilationist
arguments and accomodationist tactics. They were reluctant to chal-
lenge gender roles or to assert the right to a public sexual identity
different from the gender norms of the times.
C. The Legal Condition of Gay People: Pre-Stonewall
It has never been illegal to be gay. 4 But, in the pre-Stonewall era,
the legal consequences of choosing a gay lifestyle were sufficiently
severe to make lesbians and gay men think of themselves as criminals
just for being who they were.
Various sorts of laws have been used to harass gay people. Charges,
mostly against gay men, have been brought under vagrancy statutes
for loitering or for wearing a disguise (e.g., dressing in "drag"). 5 In
California. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 147-65 (reproducing interviews with Donaldson and
Smith).
82 Nancy May was a non-gay woman who was one of the original organizers of SIR. Id. at
142-45 (reproducing an interview with May).
83 See id. at 144-45 (reproducing an interview with Nancy May); id. at 161-62 (reproducing
an interview with Herb Donaldson).
84 See Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976) ("While
Virginia law proscribes the practice of certain forms of homosexuality, Va.Code s 18.2-361,
Virginia law does not make it a crime to be a homosexual. Indeed, a statute criminalizing such
status and prescribing punishment therefor would be invalid. See Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962).").
85 See, e.g., People v. Gillespi, 202 N.E.2d 565, 565 (N.Y. 1964) (upholding the conviction
of a man dressed as a woman under the New York vagrancy statute, which defined a vagrant
as "a person, who having his face painted, discolored, covered or concealed, or being otherwise
disguised, in a manner calculated to prevent his being identified, appears in a road or public
highway."). Two judges dissented, pointing out that the statute was never intended to apply to
cross-dressing situations. Id. (Fuld & Bergan, JJ., dissenting); see also People v. Archibald,
[Vol. 79:15511564
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the pre-Stonewall era, policemen raided gay bars and arrested patrons
for engaging in "lewd acts."'8 6 Often the patrons were too frightened
of publicity to demand a jury trial to challenge the charges. 87
The 1950s marked the arrival of McCarthyism and a heightened
concern with homosexuals. "Sexual perverts" were equated with
communists as security risks.88 On June 7, 1950, Senate Resolution
280 directed the Senate Investigations Subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Expenditures in the Executive Department "to make an inves-
tigation into the employment by the Government of homosexuals and
260 N.E.2d 871 (N.Y. 1970) (upholding conviction under same statute of man who dressed as
a woman and stood on subway platform).
The New York statute used against gay men and lesbians forbade wearing a disguise except
in cases of masquerade parties or by special permission. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 887(7)
(McKinney 1955). Martin Duberman reports that local police manuals established a further
rule to be applied in cases of cross-dressing: if the defendant is wearing too few garments
appropriate to his or her gender, the law is violated. Duberman, supra note 6, at 299 n.39. No
doubt it was this police manual rule that accounts for the understanding among gay men and
lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s that they were subject to arrest unless they had on three
garments appropriate to their gender. I have heard personally from several "butch" lesbians
who report that in the 1960s they knew they were safe from arrest if they had on at least three
items of female clothing. See also Faderman, supra note 7, at 185, for one such report from a
60-year-old lesbian in San Francisco. Joan Nestle also reports that she was advised in the
1950s in New York by older lesbians to "[a]lways wear three pieces of women's clothing... so
the vice squad can't bust you for transvestism." Madjorie Garber, Vested Interests: Cross
Dressing and Cultural Anxiety 141 (1992) (quoting Jan Nestle).
I have been unable to track down any state law in the United States that specifically forbade
women to dress in men's clothing, subject to a safe-harbor "three garment rule." Nor have I
found any reported case of a prosecution of a lesbian for cross-dressing. But see Faderman,
supra note 7, at 335 n.11 (reporting on a case in 1957 San Francisco in which two women
students were arrested in a gay bar and charged with wearing men's clothing). That there was
a widespread understanding that the law prohibited women from wearing men's clothing does
suggest that legal authority was used to harass lesbians, as well as gay men, who cross-dressed.
Prohibitions against cross-dressing can be found in city or other local ordinances. See, e.g.,
City of Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1970) (holding that
Columbus, Ohio's ordinance banning persons from dressing in clothes of the opposite sex
should not be applied to a "true transsexual" who was a prime candidate for transsexual
surgery); see also City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978) (holding that
Chicago's ordinance against cross-dressing is unconstitutional as applied to transsexuals
awaiting sex reassignment surgery).
86 Evander Smith, a gay attorney in San Francisco, reports that the police would accuse
"men of fondling each other. The police would lie." Marcus, supra note 10, at 149
(reproducing an interview with Smith and Herb Donaldson).
87 Id. at 148.
88 See Adam, supra note 8, at 56-59; D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 48-49;
Faderman, supra note 7, at 140-41.
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other sex perverts." 9 The Subcommittee concluded that homosexuals
were not "proper persons to be employed in Government for two rea-
sons; first, they are generally unsuitable, and second, they constitute
security risks." 90 General unsuitability existed because overt acts of
homosexuality constituted a crime under state and federal law.91 As
further evidence of unsuitability, the Subcommittee stated:
[I]t is generally believed that those who engage in overt acts of perver-
sion lack the emotional stability of normal persons. In addition there
is an abundance of evidence to sustain the conclusion that indulgence
in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber of an individual to a
degree that he is not suitable for a position of responsibility.92
The "unsuitability" and "security risk" arguments were related in the
sense that the criminality and immorality of the conduct forced
homosexuals to hide their behavior; they were thus thought to be vul-
nerable to blackmail. 93 Senator Kenneth Wherry less concretely wor-
ried: "You can't hardly separate homosexuals from subversives....
Mind you, I don't say every homosexual is a subversive, and I don't
say every subversive is a homosexual. But [people] of low morality
are a menace in the government, whatever [they are], and they are all
tied up together."'94
The Senate Subcommittee recommended that homosexuals be dis-
missed as unfit from all government service.95 As a result homosexu-
als were purged from government service at a higher rate than ever
before and broader screening techniques were used to keep additional
"perverts" from being hired. Shortly after his inauguration in 1953,
President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10,450 calling for the
dismissal of all government employees who were "sex perverts. 96
The Subcommittee's report also served to step up the military's
purge of lesbians and gay men. At the same time, public pronounce-
89 Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government, Interim Report by
the Subcomm. for Comm. on Expenditure in the Exec. Dep'ts, S. Doc. 241, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1950) [hereinafter Interim Report].
90 Id. at 3.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 4. No cites to the "abundance of evidence" are included in the report.
93 Id. at 3.
94 As quoted in Faderman, supra note 7, at 143.
95 Interim Report, supra note 89, at 19.
96 Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953), reprinted in Codification of
Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders 47-53 (1989).
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ments that gays were unfit and of weak moral fiber encouraged local
policemen to increase their harassment of lesbian and gay bars.97
Despite the repressive social and political climate, lesbians and gay
men began to win some protections in court. The remainder of this
Section will focus on two areas in which lesbians and gay men gained
some small degree of legal protection during the pre-Stonewall era.
First, litigation over the closing of gay bars will be discussed. Second,
litigation over the loss of federal employment will be addressed.
1. The Gay Bar Cases
The first successful American "gay rights" case was probably Stou-
men v. Reilly,9" decided by the California Supreme Court in 1951.
The case involved a dispute over whether the California Board of
Equalization could suspend the liquor license of the Black Cat restau-
rant solely because it catered to known homosexuals. The state's jus-
tification for the suspension was a provision in the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act prohibiting a licensee from running a "disorderly
house." 99 The court made two important points. First, relying on the
Unruh Civil Rights Act,1 00 the court noted that proprietors were
required to make their premises available to all classes of persons,
including homosexuals.101 Thus, the court reasoned, the proprietor
could not be held in violation of the "disorderly house" statute solely
because it made its premises available to homosexuals.1 0 2 As a result
97 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 44-45, 49-51. These public statements
regarding homosexuality led to other widespread purges as well, such as the one spearheaded
by Florida Senator Charley Johns in 1958 against students and faculty at the University of
Florida in Gainesville. Adam, supra note 8, at 59; D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at
47-48.
98 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
99 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act provided:
Every licensee or agent or employee of any licensee who keeps or permits to be used or
suffers to be used, in conjunction with a licensed premises, any disorderly house or place
in which people abide or to which people resort, to the disturbance of the neighborhood,
or in which people abide or to which people resort for purposes which are injurious to
the public morals, health, convenience or safety shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Cal. Code § 58 (Deering 1944) (current version at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24200 (West
1985)).
100 1905 Cal. Stat. 553 (codified as amended at Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52 (West 1982)).
101 Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 971.
102 Id.
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of this reasoning, Stoumen has been cited as authority for recognizing
homosexuals as a protected class under Unruh. 103
Second, in response to the board's claim that it had the constitu-
tional authority to revoke a license when necessary to protect "public
welfare and morals,"'1 4 the court stated that the board had acted arbi-
trarily in determining that the mere presence of homosexuals in a
public bar was a threat to the public welfare and morals. 05 Thus,
Stoumen also stood for the principle that it was unconstitutional
under the California Constitution to revoke a gay bar's liquor license
solely because the bar catered to known homosexuals.10 6 At the core
of the decision was the court's recognition that the state had conflated
homosexual status and conduct. Demonstrating a common sense rare
considering the time and the topic, the court stated:
The fact that the Black Cat was reputed to be a "hangout" for homo-
sexuals indicates merely that it was a meeting place for such per-
sons .... Unlike evidence that an establishment is reputed to be a
house of prostitution, which means a place where prostitution is prac-
ticed and thus necessarily implies the doing of illegal or immoral acts
on the premises, testimony that a restaurant and bar is reputed to be a
meeting place for a certain class of persons contains no such implica-
tion. Even habitual or regular meetings may be for purely social and
harmless purposes, such as the consumption of food and drink, and it
is to be presumed that a person is innocent of crime or wrong and that
the law has been obeyed.'0 7
Despite this early victory supporting the right of gay men and lesbi-
ans to socialize in gay bars, 08 state authorities in California and else-
103 See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 338 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984); Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161,
163 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982).
104 Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 971. The California Constitution provided that the State Board of
Equalization "shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny or revoke any specific liquor
license if it shall determine for good cause that the granting or continuance of such license
would be contrary to public welfare or morals." Cal. Const. art. XX, § 22 (amended in 1957
to change the ruling body from the State Board of Equalization to the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control).
105 Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 971.
106 Id. Note that the constitutional rights at stake were those of the bar owners who could
not be artitrarily and capriciously denied their property rights in their liquor license. No
constitutional rights of homosexuals were recognized in the case. Id. at 969.
107 Id. at 971.
108 This was not an insignificant right. Lesbians and gay men who grew up in the 1950s and
1960s had very few opportunities to meet other lesbians and gay men. The "bar scene" was
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where continued to harass patrons in gay bars 1 9 and, at times, to
close the bars down. In California, the harassment was carried out
pursuant to subdivision (e) of section 24200 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code,110 enacted by the legislature after the Stoumen case.
This provision authorized revocation of a liquor license if the prem-
ises were a "resort for illegal possessors or users of narcotics, prosti-
tutes, pimps, panderers, or sexual perverts." ' On its face, the new
California statute was clearly unconstitutional under Stoumen.112
Nonetheless, it was used against gay bars1 3 until 1959, when it was
finally declared unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court in
Vallegra v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.11 4
Vallegra, however, was not a total victory for gay rights. Maintain-
ing the distinction between status and conduct, the court reiterated
the Stoumen holding that catering to homosexuals was not sufficient
"good cause" for the revocation of a license. "Something more" than
the status of the patrons would be required to demonstrate good
central to the formation of lesbian and gay community. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra
note 11, at 12-13 (mentioning the role of gay bars in the formation of gay community in the
first half of the century); Faderman, supra note 7, at 79-80 (describing the importance of
lesbian bars); see also Madeline Davis & Elizabeth Lapovsky Kennedy, Boots of Leather,
Slippers of Gold (1993) (describing lesbian life in Buffalo from 1940-1960 and the role of
lesbian bars in the formation of a lesbian community).
109 John D'Emilio reports that the 1959 mayoral election in San Francisco created a
particularly difficult time for gay bars. Mayor George Christopher was up for reelection. His
opponent charged him with providing too much support for the homosexual community and
with turning San Francisco into a gay mecca. Although Christopher denied the charges and
won the election, the pro-gay charges caused him to institute a crack-down on gay bars,
presumably to demonstrate his toughness toward sexual perversion. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics,
supra note 11, at 182.
110 1953 Cal. Stat. 986 (codified at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24200 and repealed 1963).
III Id.
112 But see Kershaw v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 318 P.2d 494, 498 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (theorizing that the legislature did not mean to enact an unconstitutional
statute and thus must have meant to limit the statute's coverage to cases in which immoral or
illegal, as opposed to "harmless," behavior ocurred on the premises).
113 See id.; Nickola v. Munro, 328 P.2d 271, 276 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that
§ 24200(e) could be applied in cases in which sexual perverts used the premises as a resort for
improper, immoral, or illegal conduct); cef. Morell v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 22 Cal.Rptr. 405 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (dismissing count based on § 24200(e)
after the section had been declared unconstitutional, but upholding count based on § 25601,
prohibiting the keeping of a "disorderly house").
114 347 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959). The Vallegra decision cut short Mayor Christopher's crack-
down against San Francisco's gay bars. See supra note 109.
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cause." 5 The "something more," of course, could be the conduct of
the patrons. Exactly what conduct would be suficient to constitute
"good cause" for revocation of a license was a question not defini-
tively answered by the supreme court, however, because the lower
court impermissibly relied solely on the status of the patrons as a jus-
tification for the license revocation. 1 6
Nonetheless, the court's tone indicated how it might rule on the
issue in the future when it said:
Conduct which may fall short of aggressive and uninhibited participa-
tion in fulfilling the sexual urges of homosexuals... may nevertheless
offend good morals and decency by displays in public which do no
more than manifest such urges. This is not to say that homosexuals
might properly be held to a higher degree of moral conduct than are
heterosexuals. But any public display which manifests sexual desires,
whether they be heterosexual or homosexual in nature may, and his-
torically have been, suppressed and regulated in a moral society.'
1 7
What conduct manifests the sexual urges of homosexuals? Holding
hands? Kissing? Flirting? No doubt the California Supreme Court
in 1959 would have found all of these activities suspect. After review-
ing the evidence of conduct that had been available to the trial court
(even though the trial court had not relied on this evidence), the
supreme court concluded (in dicta) that the evidence was sufficient to
have supported a lower court ruling (if it had been made) that the
conduct was "contrary to public welfare or morals." 1 8 The evidence
of immoral conduct consisted of the following:
1. Female patrons were dressed in mannish attire and patrons
paired off male to male and female to female.
2. Women danced together and kissed each other.
3. A female patron in mannish attire told an undercover police-
woman that she was "a cute little butch."
4. The female patron kissed the policewoman and the bartender
came over and warned them that if they wanted to continue that
behavior they would have to go to the restroom.
115 Vallegra, 347 P.2d at 912.
116 Id. at 913 (noting that evidence as to specific conduct "was not relied upon by the finder
of fact in arriving at the conclusion that continuance of the license would be contrary to public
welfare or morals").
117 Id. at 912.
118 Id. at 913.
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5. A policewoman thought a man was using the woman's room,
but then determined that the person was a woman dressed as a man.
6. Two male patrons embraced each other, engaged in a short
t~te-'-tte, kissed, and announced that they were "going steady."' 19
Post-Vallegra cases in California continued to revoke liquor
licenses on the grounds that homosexual conduct on the premises was
an offense to public morals, 120 or, alternatively, that the premises were
being operated as a "disorderly house."' 2 Although police witnesses
report some behavior bordering on public lewdness,122 much of the
evidence cited in these cases sounds as harmless as the evidence cited
by the Vallegra court, i.e., cross-dressing, same-sex dancing, and
kissing. 12
3
The conduct/status distinction was also central to litigation in
other states in which the liquor licenses of gay bars were being
revoked. New York and New Jersey courts struggled with the issue
during the 1950s and 1960s.' 24 By 1967, the highest courts in both
states had ruled definitively that a license could not be revoked solely
on the grounds that the establishment catered to known homosexu-
als. 125 Despite these rulings, one year later the New York Court of
Appeals observed (in dicta) in a liquor license case involving a Wood-
119 Id. at 912-13.
120 See supra note 104 for the language of the California constitution empowering such
revocations by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
121 Section 25601 provides that "every licensee, or agent or employee of a licensee" is guilty
of a misdemeanor "who keeps, permits to be used, or suffers to be used, in conjunction with a
licensed premises, any disorderly house or place in which people abide or to which people
resort, to the disturbance of the neighborhood, or in which people abide or to which people
resort for purposes which are injurious to the public morals, health, convenience, or safety."
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25601 (West 1985).
122 See, e.g., Kershaw v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 318 P.2d 494, 496
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (reporting men fondling each others' genitals). But see the
statement of Evander Smith, supra note 86, claiming that the police often lied about seeing this
conduct.
123 See, e.g., Kershaw, 318 P.2d at 496 (males dancing cheek to cheek in close embrace, male
couples kissing, dancing with legs intertwined, and "[i]n November one male couple declared
that they had been married some three months and displayed their wedding rings").
124 For a discussion of the New York and New Jersey cases on point see Rhonda R. Rivera,
Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 3, at 914-18, 922-24 (1979).
125 See Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 233 N.E.2d 833, 834-35 (N.Y. 1967)
(holding that mere congregation of homosexuals does not make the place disorderly); One
Eleven Wine and Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d 12, 18
(N.J. 1967) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), for the proposition that one's
status cannot be criminalized).
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stock restaurant that, although one could not presume "beatniks" to
be disorderly or criminal (despite the fact that they were known to use
marijuana), "[a] different result might be indicated if the restaurant
were patronized by a concentration of homosexuals, drug users, or
recidivists, a concentration of clientele which might, even without
overt activity, permit inference of violations or likelihood of violations
of law." '126
The connection between a concentration of homosexuals and the
likelihood of criminal activity was made explicit by a Florida appel-
late court in 1967. The City of Miami had passed an ordinance that
prohibited liquor licensees from employing a known homosexual,
from selling liquor to a known homosexual, and from allowing two or
more homosexuals to congregate on the premises. The Florida court
upheld the ordinance as a rational exercise of legislative power to pro-
tect the public health, morals, and safety of the citizens of Miami.12 7
"The object of the ordinance," said the court, "is to prevent the con-
gregation at liquor establishments of persons likely to prey upon the
public by attempting to recruit other persons for acts which have been
declared illegal."' 128
These gay bar cases present a theme that continues in gay rights
litigation to the present day. Even when the law may not be used to
punish homosexual status, homosexual conduct is a different matter.
And, of course, sometimes homosexual conduct can be inferred from
the fact of homosexual status.
2. Government Employees
On January 22, 1952, Fannie Mae Clackum was discharged by the
United States Air Force "under conditions other than honorable." 129
She was not the first (or the last) member of the armed services to be
126 Sled Hill Cafe, Inc. v. Hostetter, 241 N.E.2d 714, 716 (N.Y. 1968).
127 Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So.2d 50, 51 (1967), cert. denied, 201 So.2d 895 (Fla.
1967), and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
128 Id. at 52.
129 Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (C1. Ct. 1960) (quoting the Air Force).
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tainted by allegations of homosexuality.1 30 Important conditions
attach to dishonorable discharges such as hers. For example, most
veteran's rights will be denied under both state and federal law and
the discharged serviceperson is warned that she or he will be likely
"to encounter substantial prejudice in civilian life" in the event the
military discharge papers are reviewed by employers or others.131
As for procedural fairness, Clackum was never informed of the spe-
cific charges against her. When asked to resign, she refused and
requested a trial by court-martial so that she might be informed of the
specific charges against her and defend against them. The request was
denied. Air Force Regulations provided that if there was insufficient
evidence to indicate that conviction by a general court-martial was
likely, then Clackum could be administratively discharged, with the
type of discharge determined by the Secretary of the Air Force. 131
Acting under this regulation, the Secretary informed her of her dis-
charge "under conditions other than honorable."' 133 An administra-
tive post-discharge review hearing was held at which the only
evidence presented supported Clackum's denial of lesbian activity.13 1
Nonetheless the discharge was upheld on the basis of evidence avail-
able to the review board but never presented to Clackum or her attor-
ney. 1 35 No judicial review of administrative discharges was available
at that time.
However, after the 1958 Supreme Court decision in Harmon v.
Brucker136 sanctioned judicial review of administrative discharges,
Clackum filed suit in the Court of Claims. The Clackum court
derided the Air Force for the obvious lack of due process in its dis-
charge procedures and held the discharge invalid. Citing Brucker, the
Court of Claims said:
130 From 1980 to 1990, approximately 17,000 servicemen and women were separated from
the services under charges of homosexuality. GAO Report, Defense Force Management,
DOD's Policy on Homsexuality, B-247235, at 32 (1992).
Clackum was discharged during the Korean War when discharges for homosexuality were
at a low. Randy Shilts reports that the Navy discharged 483 homosexuals in 1950, a number
that increased to 1353 as soon as the armistice was signed in 1953. Shilts, supra note 9, at 70.
131 Clackum, 296 F.2d at 227.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 228-29.
135 Id.
136 355 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of the Army exceeded his
authority by classifying two discharges as dishonorable on the basis of pre-induction activity).
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The Government defends this remarkable arrangement[13 7], and its
operation in the instant case, on the ground that it is necessary in the
interest of an efficient military establishment for our national defense.
We see nothing in this argument. The plaintiff being a member of the
Air Force Reserve, on active duty, the Air Force had the undoubted
right to discharge her whenever it pleased, for any reason or for no
reason, and by so doing preserve the Air Force from even the slightest
suspicion of harboring undesirable characters. But it is unthinkable
that it should have the raw power, without respect for even the most
elementary notions of due process of law, to load her down with pen-
alties. It is late in the day to argue that everything that the executives
of the armed forces do in connection with the discharge of soldiers is
beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny.13
Clackum tells us that persons accused of homosexuality, even by
the military in time of national defense, are nonetheless entitled to
procedural due process. Of course, Clackum consistently denied the
charges (whatever they were).139 In this sense, the case hardly stands
as a major gay rights victory. Furthermore, in extending Brucker to
accused homosexuals, the case should have resulted in the curtailment
of homosexual discharges based solely on rumor or on the coerced
statements of other service members, but history shows that it did
not.14o
In 1957, Frank Kameny was fired from the U.S. Army Map Service
because someone had reported that he was a homosexual.1 4 1 Kameny
challenged the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court and lost.142
137 The "remarkable arrangement" refers to the procedure whereby the Air Force could
dismiss her without a full trial if it thought conviction at a full trial unlikely, together with the
fact that the only "due process" hearing accorded her specifically did not allow for her to
confront her accusers or even to know what the evidence against her was. Clackum, 296 F.2d
at 228.
138 Id.
139 The opinion never specifies the charges or the evidence, but does allude to a number of
affidavits available to the Discharge of Review Board, which, "if believed, were extremely
damaging to the plaintiff." Id. at 229.
140 Despite the legal victory in Clackum, military witch-hunts continued to drum lesbians
and gay men out of the service. The nature of interrogations did not change. Shilts, supra note
9, at 124. And sometimes the interrogations went beyond the law. Id. at 127-28. Coerced
statements of guilt and the coerced naming of other homosexuals was common. Id. at 88-89,
127-28, 145. Unlike Clackum, most of those accused did not fight back. See id. at 51.
141 For a full account of Kameny's story in his own words, see Marcus, supra note 10, at 93-
103.
142 Kameny v. Brucker, 282 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (upholding the dismissal), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
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Kameny not only lost his current job, but, as a government scientist,
he found himself barred from any meaningful alternative employ-
ment. Kameny responded to the individual loss in his own case by
deciding that collective action was necessary. He began forming the
Washington, D.C., Mattachine Society just months after the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in his case. 143 Mattachine members lobbied
politicians for an end to gay discrimination in government jobs144 and
the organization became involved in some of the individual employ-
ment discrimination cases brought by civil service employees. 145
Civil service employees are not employed at will. Rather, they enjoy
a certain degree of job security in that they can be fired only for cause.
The applicable civil service regulations of the early 1960s provided
that an employee can be removed whose "conduct or capacity is such
that his removal, demotion, or reassignment will promote the effi-
ciency of the service." 146 The regulations further provided that one
ground for disqualification was "criminal, infamous, dishonest,
immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct."' 147 Consensual homo-
sexual sodomy was a crime in most states 148 and in the District of
Columbia.1 49 Thus, proof of the specific act of sodomy would satisfy
the "criminal conduct" portion of the regulations. Employees, how-
ever, were rarely dismissed as a result of criminal convictions. Fed-
eral agencies customarily dismissed employees for engaging in any
sort of homosexual conduct, 50 because homosexual conduct was
viewed as evidence of immorality. Relying on these regulations, the
federal government dismissed civil service employees for unspecified
143 Marcus, supra note 10, at 96. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text for more on
Kameny's involvement with the Mattachine Society and other gay rights organizations.
144 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 154-55.
145 The first legal victory for gay rights in federal employment came in a case that the
ACLU Washington, D.C., affiliate brought on behalf of Bruce Scott, the secretary of the
Mattachine Society. Id.; see Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that
unspecified homosexual conduct is insufficient grounds for job termination). Frank Kameny
and the Mattachine Society also acted as advisers in Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp.
600, 603-04 (D.D.C. 1972) and Wentworth v. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D.D.C. 1972).
146 5 C.F.R. § 9.101 (1961) (no longer in effect).
147 5 C.F.R. § 2.106(a)(3) (1961) (no longer in effect).
148 For an example of one such statute see Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §§ 553, 554 (Michie
Supp. 1992) (effective in early 1960s).
149 D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3502 (West 1992) (effective 1948; repealed 1993).
150 See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing how NASA
official decided to dismiss gay employee after being informed by superiors that dismissal for
any homosexual conduct was customary within the agency).
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homosexual acts1 51 as well as for acts committed prior to government
employment.1 5 2  Courts usually upheld the dismissals,1 53 but some
victories occurred. In Scott v. Macy, 1 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled that the dismissal of an employee for
engaging in "unspecified homosexual conduct" was improper.1 55 The
court ruled such allegations too vague because different persons might
understand the phrase differently.1 56 In a second round in the same
case, the same court set forth important guidelines as to a federal
employee's right to remain silent when questioned about such things
as homosexual conduct.1 57
Finally, in Norton v. Macy,1 58 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to accept the longstanding custom of the Civil Service Com-
mission that required dismissal of any employee found to have
engaged in any sort of homosexual conduct.1 59 Citing to the govern-
ment's own regulations, the court pointed out that the employee
could be dismissed only upon a showing of "such cause as will pro-
151 See, e.g., Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 183-85 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (reversing the decision of
the Civil Service Commission that had excluded an applicant from the civil service solely on
the basis that he was a "homosexual" and had engaged in "homosexual conduct," even though
no specific conduct was alleged).
152 See Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 379
U.S. 951 (1964). The facts in Dew are particularly disturbing. See id. at 583. Dew served in
the Air Force from 1951-1955. He then obtained a position with the CIA and was asked to
undergo a lie detector test in order to obtain a "secret" security clearance. In response to
questions, he admitted that he had engaged in homosexual acts at the age of 18. The CIA
offered to let him resign his position and he did so. He was then hired by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority, subject to a one-year probationary period and investigation. After 20 months of
employment and with a satisfactory performance rating, the agency obtained the CIA
investigative information and proposed to remove him. The district court and court of appeals
ruled for the government. Fortuntately for Dew, when certiorari was granted, the government
abandoned the case and reinstated him.
153 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041
(1969); Williams v. Brown, 384 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Taylor v. United States Civil
Service Commission, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967); Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
154 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
155 Id. at 184-85.
156 Id.
157 Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (announcing that an applicant for
federal employment does not forfeit "all rights of privacy" and that there must be a rational
basis for requiring applicants to answer particular questions).
158 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
159 Id. at 1168.
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mote the efficiency of the service."' 16 The government argued that
homosexuality alone was sufficient cause because homosexuality was
immoral.16 Furthermore, the government maintained that there was
evidence of particular immoral conduct in this case because the
employee had been accused of making a sexual advance toward
another man. 62 Although the conduct at issue occurred away from
the job site in the privacy of the employee's car, and even though the
incident led to no sexual activity because the advances were rebuffed,
the government maintained that the conduct was so "immoral, inde-
cent, and disgraceful"'163 as to make the employee unfit.
The court, however, demanded proof of some causal connection
between the homosexual conduct at issue and unfitness for service. 164
Norton was an important decision in this regard, establishing the
"rational nexus test" for all dismissals of government employees ter-
minated for off-duty immoral conduct. 65 Homosexuality and homo-
160 Id. at 1162.
161 Id. at 1164.
162 The following facts are detailed id. at 1162-63: Norton, a NASA employee, had been
driving around Lafayette Square (a regular hangout for gay men) in the late evening. He
picked up another man and they drove around the square once. Norton then let the other man
out of the car. The events were witnessed by police stakeouts who arrested both men. The
man Norton had picked up accused Norton of touching his leg. No further sexual conduct
was alleged. Norton was interrogated by the police for two hours, but he steadfastly denied
making homosexual advances and was given a traffic summons. The Security Chief of NASA
was called by the police and witnessed the interrogation. After the police had finished, the
NASA Security Chief commenced a separate interrogation, lasting until 6:00 a.m. Finally
Norton admitted to minimal homosexual conduct during high school and college, and claimed
to have had blackouts during his adult life that might have accompanied homosexual acts.
163 Id. at 1163.
164 Id. at 1164-65. In particular, the court required the government to demonstrate an
"ascertainable deleterious effect on the efficiency of the service" before terminating an
employee for an immoral act. Id. at 1165.
165 The nexus requirement was codified in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L.
No. 95-454, § 907, 92 Stat. 1111, 1227. Prior to the adoption of this statute, the Norton
holding was relied upon as authority in numerous cases involving the dismissal of government
employees for various types of immoral off-duty conduct. See Major v. Hampton, 413 F.
Supp. 66, 71-72 (E.D. La. 1976) (holding that IRS agent could not be dismissed from service
solely on grounds of off-duty private heterosexual activity absent showing that off-duty
"trysts" affected job performance). Norton continues to be cited in cases involving public
employees who are not covered by the federal statute. State and local government employment
cases hace also relied on Norton. See, e.g., Erb v. Iowa State Bd. of Public Instruction, 216
N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa 1974) (teacher's act of adultery not sufficient ground for revocation of
teaching certificate in absence of evidence that isolated occurrence in an otherwise
unblemished past would have an adverse effect on fitness to teach); Morrison v. State Bd. of
Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 393 (Cal. 1969) (holding that a teacher who engages in private consensual
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sexual conduct were no longer per se justifications for dismissal.
Nonetheless, the Norton court acknowledged that homosexual con-
duct might at times be relevant to job performance and thus serve as a
rational basis for termination of employment. Such conduct might,
for example, invite blackmail, or evidence an unstable personality.'66
Alternatively, if the conduct occurred on the job, or was sufficiently
notorious, it might affect the employee's working relations with other
employees or the public.167
Because post-Norton cases were willing to adopt the "nexus test,"
the battle shifted to a focus on what sorts of conduct were sufficient to
justify job termination. Thus, for example, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in McConnell v. Anderson '68 upheld the denial of a univer-
sity librarianship to an otherwise qualified candidate solely because he
applied for a license to marry another male, an event surrounded by a
certain degree of local publicity. 69 Although the District Court had
relied on Norton to reverse the university's decision, the Court of
Appeals held that the university's decision was warranted, explaining
that:
homosexual act is not necessarily unfit to teach absent some further showing of nexus between
the conduct and the unfitness). But see Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 535 P.2d 804,
805-06 (Wash. 1975), appeal after remand, 559 P.2d 1340 (Wash. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
879 (1977) (upholding school board's dismissal of extremely talented teacher solely because,
when asked, he admitted he was gay).
Because Norton was decided under the due process clause, id. at 1164, decisions that follow
its holding must find that the employee's job rights constitute "property."
166 These justifications echo the "findings" in the 1950 Interim Report of the Senate
Subcommittee. For a discussion of this report, see supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
167 This suggested "causal showing" would give effect to the prejudices of the public and of
fellow employees. A lesbian or gay employee would be advised under the Norton court's
rationale to stay closeted at work to ensure that his or her "gayness" does not impair job
performance by creating an affront to others. But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1165
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992) (relying on Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
433 (1984), to say that private prejudice is not a sufficient justification for refusing to hire
someone).
168 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
169 Id. at 195-96. Although McConnell went through a marriage ceremony with his
partner, Richard Baker, the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to recognize the legality of
the marriage under state law and rejected the couple's constitutional claims regarding same-
sex marriage. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972). See also McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing
Minnesota opinion as binding authority on federal court regarding question of whether
McConnell and Baker could be treated as spouses for purposes of federal verterans' benefits).
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[I]t is at once apparent that this is not a case involving were homosex-
ual propensities on the part of a prospective employee. Neither is it a
case in which an applicant is excluded from employment because of a
desire clandestinely to pursue homosexual conduct. It is, instead,...
a case in which the applicant seeks employment on his own terms; a
case in which the prospective employee demands, as shown both by
the allegations of the complaint and by the marriage license incident
as well, the right to pursue an activist role in implementing his uncon-
ventional ideas concerning the societal status to be accorded homo-
sexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of this socially repugnant
concept upon his employer, who is, in this instance, an institution of
higher learning.170
The lesson of McConnell and other post-Norton cases was that secret
homosexual conduct might not be sufficient grounds for job termina-
tion. The more public the conduct, however, the more likely an
employer would be found justified in terminating the employee.171
D. Summary
After World War II, gays and lesbians became more visible than
their predecessors. They formed homophile organizations in major
cities and produced publications that presented a positive view of gay
and lesbian life. The Supreme Court's formulation of obscenity doc-
trine in the 1950s and 1960s ensured gay and lesbian publications of
greater First Amendment protections. Court decisions pronouncing
the right of homosexuals to be served in bars provided safer social
environments and federal employees challenged their dismissal for
homosexuality with some degree of success. Nonetheless, early legal
victories also set the stage for the conduct/status distinction that
dominates gay and lesbian litigation today. Discrimination on the
basis of status and totally private conduct found a certain degree of
protection in the courts. But once conduct crossed from the private
into the public sphere, legal protections diminished.
170 McConnell, 451 F.2d at 196.
171 McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353, 357 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973) ("The distinction between a private, noncriminal act ... and a criminal act committed in
a public place is obvious."); see also Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 101 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972) ("[Hl]omosexual behavior in a public place constituted sufficient proof of
unfitness for service in the public school system.").
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II. STONEWALL, GRISWOLD, AND GAY LIBERATION
A. The Significance of Stonewall
Most lesbian and gay rights activists cite June 27, 1969, as the
beginning of the modem gay liberation movement. On that evening,
when the New York police raided the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in
Greenwich Village, something unusual happened. The patrons,
mostly gay men, resisted police harassment, thereby sparking three
days of riots known as the Stonewall riots (or, the Stonewall Rebel-
lion). Gay solidarity throughout the country generated many similar
demonstrations of gay pride.172
The Stonewall riots did not create the modem gay liberation move-
ment. The movement's origins, as demonstrated in the previous Part,
can be traced to the formation of the Mattachine Society in Los Ange-
les in the early 1950s, the concentrated litigation efforts in Washing-
ton, D.C. against the federal government, and the growing resistance
to police raids of gay bars and gay social events in San Francisco in
the 1950s and 1960s.
Nor can the gay liberation movement be viewed in isolation from
the other radical movements of the 1960s. Martin Luther King
preached nonviolent opposition to the racist power structure and led
civil rights marches to protest the inequality between black and white
Americans. Student radicals in Berkeley challenged the authorities in
charge of the University of California by claiming their free speech
rights. Students exercised these rights by protesting the war in Viet
Nam. Students for a Democratic Society was formed in the early
1960s in Michigan and launched a new left political movement. The
second wave of feminism began in the early 1960s, and by the late
1960s had spawned several radical organizations. 17 3 In 1968, protes-
ters at the Democratic convention in Chicago were beaten by police
officers. It was within this broader context of resistance and public
challenges to governmental authority that the Stonewall riots began.
172 See, e.g., D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 233-37 (noting how gay radicals
demonstrated at Berkeley the following fall and gay liberation front members appeared at
demonstrations and events sponsored by other political groups); Duberman, supra note 6, at
209-11 (describing how the spirit of Stonewall affected the Independence Hall demonstration
in Philadelphia that July 4th).
173 NOW was formed in 1965, but dissatisfaction with NOW's conservatism led to the
creation of more radical groups. Redstockings was formed in early 1969. See Duberman,
supra note 6, at 173.
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The Stonewall riots provided a symbolic radical shift in lesbian and
gay arguments for civil rights. No longer would the movement be
primarily about obtaining the right, so long as lesbians and gay men
looked and acted like heterosexuals, to be treated just like heterosexu-
als in public. 174 The symbolic power of Stonewall lay in the fact that
it was the drag queens and the nellies-the most unassimilated-who
were the most visible and the most vocal. 175 They were demanding
respect and they were demanding the right to be different. 176
Just four years earlier, the Supreme Court had made its own contri-
bution to this new gay and lesbian movement. The Court's decision
in Griswold v. Connecticut 17 7 recognized a right to privacy in the con-
text of marital sex 178 and gave lawyers the necessary foothold to begin
challenging the criminalization of homosexual conduct. Historian
John D'Emilio cites this moment as an important turnaround for the
ACLU in regard to its position on homosexuality. 79 Despite the
hope of Griswold and the legal challenges that it inspired, however,
Stonewall has proven to be the more important event of the late
1960's for lesbians and gay men.
B. Social and Political Organizations
Stonewall was quickly followed by the formation of new gay libera-
tion organizations.1 80  Inspired by the radical politics of the 1960s,
these new groups broke rank with the older homophile organizations
174 This assimilationst claim to rights is exactly what the founders of Mattachine did not
want and why they criticized the conservative takeover in 1954. See D'Emilio, Making
Trouble, supra note 11, at 17-56.
It is also interesting that the New York City Mattachine Society was perturbed by the
Stonewall riots and pled with the gay community to stop the rioting and to maintain peace and
quiet in the Village. Duberman, supra note 6, at 207.
175 See generally Duberman, supra note 6, at 181-202 (giving a detailed description of the
Stonewall riot and its participants).
176 Duberman, supra note 6, at 211-12.
177 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178 Id. at 483-86 (finding a constitutional right to privacy and striking down a Connecticut
statute that made it a criminal offense to use contraceptives).
179 See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 212 (citing to ACLU correspondence in
which Alan Reitman, then associate director of the national office, said of Griswold: "Once we
have the high court's opinion in this area, we will be in a position to determine our policy on
the civil liberties aspect of a variet of sexual practices, including homosexuality.").
180 Duberman, supra note 6, at 212, 221-33.
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and their leaders. 181 Gay liberation in the post-Stonewall days was
not a civil rights movement to gain equality for homosexuals. Rather,
it was a movement focused on the sexual oppression of all people,
with the goal of liberating the "homosexuality" in everyone.1 "' In
this regard, gay liberation resembled the more radical forces in the
women's liberation movement.
The new gay liberation groups did not turn immediately to the
courts, but rather turned out into the streets. Two of the most active
groups were the Gay Liberation Front and the Gay Activists Alli-
ance. In addition to demonstrating against anti-gay policies and
homophobic employers, gay activists showed up at political forums to
question candidates about their position on gay issues. The silence of
the closet was broken by this new visibility as the ranks of persons
willing to stand up and be counted as lesbian and gay swelled
significantly. 83
Perhaps the most successful challenge by these new activists was
the assault mounted against the American Psychiatric Association to
remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders. The official
vote of the Association's Board of Trustees occurred in late 1973.184
Some members of the Association, irate at the action, demanded a
vote of the general membership on the issue. The original action of
the Board was endorsed by fifty-eight percent of the membership.185
Most historians of this event credit the new gay liberation movement
for this outcome."8 6 Because the medical profession's definitions of
181 See Duberman, supra note 6, at 227-28 (describing the debate between older homophiles
and young turks at the ECHO convention in November 1969); see also Adam, supra note 8, at
79 (describing a confrontation between the old guard and the new radicals at a NACHO
meeting in San Francisco in 1970).
182 Adam, supra note 8, at 78; see also Stephen Epstein, Politics, Ethnic Identity: The
Limits of Social Constructionism in Forms of Desire 239, 252-53 (Edward Stein, ed. 1990).
183 John D'Emilio estimates that the total membership in lesbian and gay organizations
before Stonewall approximated 5000. One year after the Stonewall riots, in June 1970, well
over 5000 men and women in New York City alone marched in the first gay pride event to
commemorate Stonewall. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 219, 237-38.
184 Greenberg, supra note 14, at 429.
185 Marcus, supra note 10, at 254.
186 See, e.g., Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of
Diagnosis (1981). Judd Marmor, a Los Angeles psychiatrist, disagrees with Bayer's assertion
that psychiatrists were pressured by gay activists to change their opinion about homosexuality,
referring to earlier efforts of his own and others to combat the notion that homosexuality was
an illness. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 253-54. Nonetheless some commentators insist that
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illness can have meaningful legal consequences, 1 7 this victory within
the American Psychiatric Association was equivalent to winning an
important test case in the courts.
By the early 1970s, the movement began to split into radical and
conservative camps, a not uncommon event in the life of social and
political movements. The Gay Activists Alliance had become more
structured and separated itself from the more radical Gay Liberation
Front. Eventually the Alliance dissolved and began anew in 1973 as
the National Gay Task Force (now the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force). 18 Overall, the defining characteristics of the gay move-
ment in the immediate post-Stonewall years were its increasing visibil-
ity and the vitality of its more radical demands for the freedom to be
different.
C. Legal Organizations
1. The American Civil Liberties Union
During the 1950s the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
was periodically asked to provide legal assistance to gay people who
had suffered discrimination. Drawing a line between speech and
belief, which were constitutionally protected, and sexual conduct,
which was not constitutionally protected, the ACLU generally
refused to handle gay rights cases. In 1957, the ACLU issued its first
national policy statement on the rights of homosexuals, sustaining the
constitutionality of sodomy statutes and admitting that homosexual-
ity was a valid issue for security clearances. 8 9 The organization did
step in, however, to protect the due process rights of gay people. The
ACLU thus opposed entrapment and proposals for the compulsory
registration of homosexuals.190
Several ACLU affiliates, notably Southern California and Washing-
ton, D.C., fought to reverse the national office position. In 1964, gay
because the vote was taken under pressure, psychatrists have not truly changed their opinion
about homosexuality. See Greenberg, supra note 14, at 429-30.
187 For example, in the right to die case, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 266-67 (1990), the Supreme Court cited a Missouri statute that provided: "For all legal
purposes, the occurrence of human death shall be determined in accordance with the usual and
customary standards of medical practice."
188 See generally Adam, supra note 8, at 80-82 (discussing changes within the movement).
189 See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 156.
190 Walker, supra note 25, at 312.
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rights was on the agenda at the national convention. Harriet Pilpel
argued that privacy rights should cover homosexual conduct.1 91
Although the resolution that emerged from the national convention
was in favor of decriminalization, apparently the national office con-
tinued to consider homosexuality a valid concern for security clear-
ances. Thus, the ACLU was unwilling to join in Frank Kameny's
fight against the ban on homosexuals in government employment. 192
The ACLU has been criticized for its reluctance to step in and
endorse gay rights as a civil liberties issue. 193 The reluctance should
not be surprising. In the 1950s and 1960s, there was no gay rights
movement and ACLU staff and board members were likely to include
persons who had stereotypical views of homosexuals. Yet, shortly
after Griswold was decided, several Board members pushed for the
inclusion of gay rights cases as part of the ACLU agenda. Harriet
Pilpel in particular spoke out in favor of an agenda that would include
challenges to sodomy statutes. Finally, in 1967, the ACLU took the
position that all private consensual conduct, heterosexual as well as
homosexual, ought to be protected by the privacy right recognized in
Griswold. 194 Five years later, in 1973, the ACLU created the Sexual
Privacy Project to work on privacy challenges to government regula-
tion of sexuality. In 1984, Nan Hunter left the Reproductive Free-
dom Project to become the first executive director of the ACLU's Gay
and Lesbian Rights Project. 195
2. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
In 1973 a new gay liberation organization was formed, a public
interest law firm to be run by lesbians and gay men to serve the les-
bian and gay community. The Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund was first conceived in early 1972. Bill Thom and several other
gay lawyers decided to incorporate the organization as a public inter-
est law firm under New York law. New York law at the time forbade
191 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 156; Walker, supra note 25, at 312.
192 Gay activist attorney Tom Stoddard reports that he has a copy of a 1967 letter from
Allan Reitman, associate director of the ACLU, to the Mattachine Society saying that the
ACLU was not interested in Mattachine's issues. Telephone Interview with Tom Stoddard
(Nov. 1992).
193 Vern L. Bullough, Lesbianism, Homosexuality, and the American Civil Liberties Union,
13 J. Homosexuality 23, 24 (1986).
194 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 213.
195 Walker, supra note 25, at 312-13.
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the practice of law by a corporation or association unless the organi-
zation was "organized for benevolent or charitable purposes, or for
the purpose of assisting persons without means in the pursuit of any
civil remedy." 196 Basing its charter and petition on that of the
recently approved Puerto Rican Defense Fund, Thorn applied to the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court for approval.
The application was rejected unanimously. 197
Lambda's purposes, as stated in its application to the court, were:
The attorneys employed by the Corporation will render, provide and
carry out the practice of law activities of the Corporation as set forth
in this paragraph. These activities include providing without charge
legal services in those situations which give rise to legal issues having
a substantial effect on the legal rights of homosexuals; to promote
the availability of legal services to homosexuals by encouraging and
attracting homosexuals into the legal profession; to disseminate to
homosexuals general information concerning their legal rights and
obligations, and to render technical assistance to any legal services
corporation or agency in regard to legal issues affecting
homosexuals. 198
The Appellate Division proclaimed that "[tihe stated purposes are
on their face neither benevolent nor charitable... nor, in any event,
is there a demonstrated need for this corporation." 199 The difference
between Lambda and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund, said the court, was that the Puerto Rican community was poor
and thus could not otherwise afford legal assistance."z° Admitting
that the gay community suffered from discrimination, the court none-
theless reasoned that there had been no proof offered to show that the
discrimination prevented gay and lesbian clients from obtaining ade-
quate legal representation.2 1 In other words, "charity" does not
include attempts to remedy discrimination unless it can be shown that
the victims of discrimination are also poor.
196 N.Y. Jud. Law § 495(5) (McKinney 1983) (specific language cited was repealed in 1979).
197 In re Thorn, 337 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (per curiam), rev'd, 301 N.E.2d
542 (N.Y. 1973).
198 Id. at 589.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
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The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's denial
of Lambda's application. 0 2 Finally on October 18, 1973, the lower
court approved Thorn's application and Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund was officially incorporated and authorized to prac-
tice law.2 °3
This year, 1993, Lambda celebrates its twentieth anniversary.
Together with the ACLU, Lambda has helped to shape gay rights
litigation across the country. In 1977, the two organizations joined
together to challenge the New York State sodomy statute,2 4 the con-
stitutionality of which was before the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Rice.20 5 Focusing on the right to privacy, the organizations
continued to mount challenges to sodomy statutes.20 6 In addition, on
November 20, 1983, the two organizations hosted a national meeting
202 301 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1973) (per curiam).
203 Application of Thorn, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (per curiam). It appears
that the Appellate Division was not completely happy with the instruction from the highest
court to approve Lambda's application. Reasserting its discretionary power to review the
specifies of corporate charters, the court mandated the removal of one purpose from Lambda's
charter before granting full approval. The removed purpose was "to promote legal education
among homosexuals by recruiting and encouraging potential law students who are
homosexuals and by providing assistance to such students after admission to law school." Id.
204 N.Y. Penal Law § 130.38 (McKinney 1987).
205 363 N.E.2d 1371 (N.Y. 1977). Lambda and the New York Civil Liberties Union filed a
joint brief when the case was before the New York Court of Appeals. See Lambda News,
(Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1977, at 1.
The plaintiffs presented a constitutional challenge to the consensual sodomy statute, which
forbade unmarried couples from engaging in "deviate sexual intercourse." N.Y. Penal Law
§ 130.38. The case was before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss the criminal
information that had been issued against them. The trial court held the statute in violation of
the equal protection clause, finding no rational basis for distinguishing between married and
unmarried couples. People v. Rice, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484, 488 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1975). That
decision was reversed on appeal. People v. Mehr, 383 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (N.Y. App. Term.
1976) (holding that marital privacy interests recognized under Griswold supported the
marital/nonmarital distinction). The New York Court of Appeals ultimately avoided the
constitutional questions, refusing to rule on so difficult an issue "without a trial record and
solely on the informations fied." Rice, 363 N.E.2d at 1371. Thus, the court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss, without prejudice, and reserved review of the constitutional
issues in the event the defendants were actually convicted. Id. at 1372.
The New York statute was ultimately ruled unconstitutional in People v. Onofre, 415
N.E.2d 936, 939-41 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
206 In addition to Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 937, see New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246
(1984), which was argued before the Supreme Court by Lambda Board member Bill Gardner.
An ACLU amicus brief was also filed in Uplinger. Id.
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of gay and lesbian legal organizations to develop a national strategy
for eradicating sodomy laws across the country.20 7
D. Why Challenge Sodomy Statutes?
Mainstream lawyers and activists have not always understood why
gay and lesbian legal organizations focus their attention on sodomy
laws. After all, sodomy laws are rarely enforced against consenting
adults in private. Surely fear of prosecution is not the main concern
of most gay men and lesbians. Was the focus on sodomy challenges
determined by the fact that, in light of Griswold and Roe,2 °8 such
challenges seemed the most promising for setting constitutional
precedent?
In answer to these questions, which came both from without and
within the gay and lesbian community, Lambda's legal director, Abby
Rubenfeld,2 °9 stressed the fact that "sodomy laws are the bedrock of
legal discrimination against gay men and lesbians." 210 Associating
homosexuals with sodomy and thus with criminal activity had been at
the core of earlier governmental action against gay men and lesbians.
Raids on gay bars were often justified on grounds that criminal activ-
ity might result where gay persons congregate.21 1 The 1950 Senate
Subcommittee report recommending that all homosexuals be dis-
missed from government service relied in large part on the fact that
same-sex sexual conduct was both criminal and immoral.212 Persons
who engaged in such conduct were presumed to be morally weak and
thus unfit for employment in responsible positions. So long as consen-
sual same-sex sodomy remained a crime, these justifications for dis-
crimination against gay people were more difficult to attack.
The role played by sodomy laws in anti-gay discrimination in the
1980s was much the same as in earlier decades. It was not the risk of
207 Lambda Update (Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York, N.Y.), Feb.
1984, at 3.
208 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right to privacy to encompass a
woman's decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy).
209 Rubenfeld was the Legal Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund from
1983-1988 and a co-convenor of the sodomy task force. In 1988, Paula Ettelbrick became the
legal director.
210 Lambda Update, supra note 207, at 3.
211 See supra notes 98-128 and accompanying text.
212 See Interim Report, supra note 89, at 3-6. For a fuller discussion of the report, see supra
notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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prosecution for sodomy that concerned gay men and lesbians.
Rather, it was the risk of being branded as a criminal once one's sex-
ual orientation became known.213 So long as gay men and lesbians
were presumed to engage in acts of criminal sodomy, employers could
argue that they should not be forced to hire criminals and landlords
could argue that they should not be forced to rent to criminals.2 14
Within the gay and lesbian community, sodomy challenges were
often perceived as a male issue.215  Lesbians were more concerned
with family issues such as custody and domestic partner benefits.
Lambda's Rubenfeld spoke to lesbian activists about the importance
of sodomy challenges to lesbian issues.2z 6 To illustrate her point, she
described a Tennessee custody case in which her lesbian client was
branded as a criminal 217 in open court by counsel for the husband.
The effect of this claim was to diminish the positive impact of expert
testimony as to the mother's fitness. Nor should lesbians assume that
sodomy statutes are not enforced against private lesbian sexual con-
duct. Rubenfeld represented a woman who was given a five-year sen-
tence for private consensual conduct. The woman served over two
years before she was eligible for parole.21 8
213 Consider Henry Gerber's explanation for why no reputable persons would associate with
his organization in 1924 and the Senate Subcommittee's Interim Report that concluded that
engaging in criminal behavior made all homosexuals unfit for government service. See text
accompanying notes 28-32; Interim Report, supra note 89, at 3-4.
214 See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (noting how
homosexuals "suffer discrimination in housing, employment and other areas"), appeal
dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd on reh'g, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
215 Many lesbians identified sodomy statutes as a concern primarily of gay men because the
statutes were most often applied to gay men arrested for engaging in gay sex in semi-public
places such as rest stops.
216 In 1985-1986, before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Rubenfeld addressed various lesbian groups across the
country on the importance of the Hardwick case to lesbians. I was present at a speech she gave
in Austin, Texas in the spring of 1986.
217 Consensual same-sex sodomy is still a crime in Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-510 (1991).
218 The case Rubenfeld handled is not reported. Rubenfeld entered the case to help the
woman get out on parole. Rubenfeld told me that the woman "got on the wrong side of the
sheriff" in a small town. The sheriff "got a search warrant and came out and arrested" the
woman under the state's "crime against nature" statute. Telephone Interview with Abby
Rubenfeld, former Legal Director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (Apr.
19, 1993).
For a reported case involving a conviction and prison sentence for lesbian consensual sex,
see People v. Livermore, 155 N.W.2d 711, 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (involving two women
1588
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The campaign to erase sodomy statutes from the books was consis-
tent with the impulses of gay liberation. Gay liberation was always
about sexual freedom and the breaking down of stereotypes. So long
as state laws criminalizing lesbians and gay men for engaging in inti-
mate sexual behavior remained on the books, the state's repressive
power was legitimated. This state power to define good and bad sex
was a barrier for those gay and lesbian individuals who sought to
redefine themselves publicly as good, moral, and noncriminal.
III. THE SODOMY CASES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
A. Before Hardwick
1. Challenges to Sodomy Statutes
In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled in a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by Florida prisoners that the Florida sodomy statute, which
prohibited the "abominable and detestable crime against nature," was
not unconstitutionally vague because the Florida courts had specified
the content of the crime by construing the statute to prohibit oral and
anal sex.219 No other constitutional challenges to the Florida statute
were pursued in that case.220
Two years later a federal district court in Virginia was asked to rule
on the constitutionality of that state's sodomy statute. In Doe v. Com-
221monwealth's Attorney, several gay male plaintiffs asserted that they
engaged in sexual conduct inside their tent on public camping grounds; Livermore was
sentenced to a term of one-and-a-half to five years).
219 Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 21-22 (1973) (per curiam).
220 Id. The Florida Supreme Court had ruled, in Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21, 24 (Fla.
1971), that the sodomy statute was void for vagueness. Franklin was to be applied
prospectively only, id., and thus was not available to the already convicted parties in
Wainright. The United States Supreme Court saw no difficulty in the Florida court's decision
to apply Franklin prospectively, denying relief to the already convicted parties in Wainwright.
Wainwright, 414 U.S. at 23-24.
221 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afi'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). No national gay rights
organizations were involved at the beginning of this case. Lambda did file an amicus brief after
the Supreme Court's summary affirmance asking for the Court to reconsider, a request that the
Court denied. 425 U.S. 985. Randy Shilts reports that the case began after gay activist Bruce
Voeller and others had discussed the possiblity of such a challenge in an open forum with
Justice William 0. Douglas. Shilts, supra note 9, at 283. According to Shilts:
The case seemed ill-fated from the start. Scheduling problems precluded appointment of
a normal federal appeals court panel in Richmond. Instead two elderly judges were
brought out of retirement to sit on the three-member panel hearing the case. Both voted
in favor of the statute in the two-to-one ruling.
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regularly engaged in consensual homosexual sodomy in private and
feared arrest under the sodomy statute.2 2 Relying primarily on Gris-
wold,223 they argued that the statute, as applied to such private con-
sensual homosexual conduct, violated their right to privacy under the
First and Ninth Amendments, their due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, their First Amendment right to
freedom of expression, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.22 4 The court rejected these claims, cit-
ing language in Justice Arthur J. Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold
which differentiated homosexuality and adultery on the one hand
from marital intimacy on the other.225
Doe was summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court,226 and for the next ten years, until the Court revisited the issue
in Hardwick, gay rights litigation was affected by conflicting opinions
regarding the precedential value of Doe.227 For example, the Court of
Shilts, supra note 9, at 284. Judge Robert R. Merhige was the dissenting judge. For another
gay rights case involving activist Bruce Voeller, see United States v. Various Articles of
Obscene Merchandise, 514 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
222 Id. at 1200.
223 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
224 Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
225 Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499, (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). Justice John
Harlan's passage is as follows:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids
altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted
feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow,
but which always and in every age it has fostered and protected.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 553. But see Judge Merhige's dissent in Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1204, pointing
out that Griswold had already been extended beyond marital intimacy by Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972), and that therefore the Goldberg/Harlan language was not a valid indica-
tion of the limits of the right of privacy.
226 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Doe went to the Supreme Court by right of appeal. Thus, absent
any finding of a procedural defect, the Court had no choice but to hear the case. Summary
affirmances, without the benefit of oral argument and with no statement of the rationale, are
typical in right of appeal cases. See Charles Alan Wright, Federal Courts 755-57 (4th ed.
1983).
Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens voted to hear oral
arguments in the case. Doe, 425 U.S. at 901.
227 Summary affirmances are decisions made on the merits and thus they bind lower courts.
Nonetheless their precedential value is unclear because there is no rationale for the affirmance.
See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (stating that lower courts are bound "until
such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are not") (quoting Doe v. Hodgson, 478
F.2d 537, 539, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973)); see also Note, The Precedential Effect of
1590
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Appeals of New York and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania both
ruled that their state sodomy statutes violated the federal constitution
despite the summary affirmance in Doe.228 Other state courts relied
on the authority of Doe to uphold their own sodomy statutes against
similar federal constitutional challenges.
229
2. The Consequences of Doe
The Supreme Court's affirmance of Doe presaged Hardwick in
more ways than one. In addition to denying gay men and lesbians
constitutional protection for their most intimate expressions of rela-
tionship (i.e., engaging in sexual conduct that has been criminalized
Summary Affirmances and Dismissals, 64 Va. L. Rev. 117 (1978) (discussing the problems in
determining the precedential meaning of summary affirmances).
228 See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939-41 (N.Y. 1980) (finding New York's sodomy
statute unconstitutional), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415
A.2d 47, 51-52 (Pa. 1980) (finding Pennsylvania's statute unconstitutional). The Iowa
Supreme Court ignored the recently-affirmed Doe when it declared the Iowa sodomy statute
unconstitutional in a case involving heterosexual sodomy. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d
348, 359 (Iowa 1976).
The denial of certiorari in Onofre was cited by gay rights litigators and some courts to
support the position that the Doe affirmance should not be read as refusing to extend Griswold
to same-sex sodomy. See, e.g., Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir.
1984). Although it is true that certiorari denials have no precedential value, the denial in
Onofre certainly added confusion to what the Supreme Court had intended in summarily
affirming Doe. Perhaps this was a sign that the affirmance said nothing about the application
of Griswold to same-sex sodomy. Some have argued that the plaintiffs in Doe lacked standing
and perhaps the Court meant to affirm on those grounds. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing the standing argument). The response to this
argument was that if standing was an issue in Doe, the Court should have said so.
On the same day that Doe was summarily affirmed, the Court also denied certiorari to a
North Carolina sodomy challenge in which the state court upheld the sodomy statute. See
State v. Enslin, 214 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 217 S.E.2d 669 (N.C. 1975), and
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976). In 1977, the Court denied certiorari in a case that upheld
the dismissal of a gay teacher. See Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340
(Wash. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). In 1978, it denied certiorari in a case that
required recognition of a gay student group, Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). This reluctance to rule on gay rights issues led
Bruce Ennis of the ACLU to comment "that the Supreme Court was not about to expand gay
rights, that they didn't even want to have to deal with anything as controversial if they didn't
have to, and that it was probably a waste of time to take gay rights cases to the court." Martin
Mintz, The Supreme Court: Remaining Silent on Homosexual Rights, Wash. Post, Dec. 11,
1979, at A3.
229 See, e.g., People v. Masten, 292 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd per
curiam, 322 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. 1982); see also Kelly v. State, 412 A.2d 1274, 1275 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1980) (involving heterosexual sodomy), aff'd sub nom. Neville v. State, 430 A.2d
570 (Md. 1981).
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by the state), Doe was cited by lower courts to support other instances
of anti-gay discrimination. The conflation of gay sexual conduct and
gay status, a problem that had arisen in early litigation involving gay
bars, became even more evident and more problematic in these post-
Doe cases.
Contributing to the conflation of conduct and status was the courts'
tendency to refer to "homosexual conduct" 230 or "homosexual activ-
ity ' 231 instead of giving specific descriptions of the conduct at issue.
Rules and regulations banning "homosexuality" were validated by
courts with no explanation as to whether the thing being banned was
status or conduct.2 32 Despite the fact that most cases did involve evi-
dence of specific homosexual sexual acts,2 33 the broader references to
"conduct" and "activity" made these cases appear to stand for a nega-
tive judgment against all things homosexual. In the following discus-
sion, I will focus on the exact conduct emphasized by the courts in
making their decisions.
230 See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir 1984) ("On April 21,
1981, the United States Navy discharged James L. Dronenburg for homosexual conduct.")
(emphasis added); Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76,79 (D.D.C. 1977) ("[A]n individual's right
to privacy does not extend to homosexual conduct even where it occurs in private between
consenting adults.") (emphasis added), vacated and remanded, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
231 See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing the facts of
Mary Saal's discharge by referring to "homosexual relations" and "homosexual activity"
without ever further specifying what Saal actually did), cert.denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Berg,
436 F. Supp. at 79 ("The dismissal of plaintiff due to his homosexual activity places no
restriction on his right to associate with whomever he chooses and clearly does not contravene
the First Amendment.") (emphasis added).
232 See, e.g., Berg, 436 F. Supp. at 79, quoting the then applicable Navy regulations,
SECNAVIST 1900.9A, which provided that "[t]he basic policy of the Navy towards
homosexuals is [that] ... m]embers involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who
cannot be tolerated in a military organization." The opinion fails to clarify what it means to be
"involved in homosexuality."
233 Judge Gerhard A. Gesell provides one of the more specific descriptions in the Matlovich
case:
He concedes that he has engaged in homosexual acts in Florida, Louisiana, Virginia and
Washington, D.C. These acts have included mutual masturbation, anal intercourse and
fellatio. His partners have all been persons of his age or slightly younger, never younger
than twenty-one, to his knowledge. His partners have included doctors, dentists,
lawyers and without exception respectable citizens. He has met these people in private,
off base and off duty, in hotel rooms or other places of abode. Other persons have never
been present.
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,325, at 6089
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1976), vacated, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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a. Immigration and Naturalization
The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") has been
notorious for conflating homosexual status and conduct. Prior to the
American Psychological Association's decision to remove homosexu-
ality from its list of mental disorders, the INS deported homosexual
aliens on grounds that they were "afflicted with psychopathic person-
ality." This interpretation of "psychopathic personality" was upheld
by the Supreme Court in Boutellier v. INS.234
Aliens can be deported if they commit a "crime of moral turpi-
tude, '23 a category that normally includes crimes of a sexual nature.
Crimes of moral turpitude also become relevant when petitioning for
naturalization because the alien must prove good moral character for
the five years preceding the petition.236 Despite the fact that she had
never been convicted of a crime, in 1968 a New York court denied
Olga Schmidt's petition for naturalization on the basis that she had
engaged in sexual behavior with a woman in the privacy of their
home.237 In a petition by another alien just two years later, on similar
facts, the federal district court for the southern district of New York
disagreed with the result in Schmidt.23 8
Doe, however, produced a negative impact in a later immigration
case. In 1980, Judge Oran R. Lewis, one of the three judges on the
Doe panel, denied the naturalization petition of Horst Nemetz
because he admitted having sexual relations with (and only with) his
male "roommate" for the ten-year period preceding the petition.23 9
The petition was opposed by the INS on grounds that Nemetz had
failed to prove he was a "person of good moral character" because he
"admitted that he had committed a crime."' 240 The court, citing Doe,
noted that the crime at issue, sodomy, as defined by Virginia law, was
"a crime involving moral turpitude. '241
234 387 U.S. 118, 120-23 (1967). Boutellier was one of the early gay cases supported by the
ACLU. Id. at 118.
235 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(3) (1988).
236 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1988).
237 In re Schmidt, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
238 In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 928-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
239 Petition of Nemetz, 485 F. Supp. 470, 471 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Nemetz v.
INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981).
240 Id.
241 Id.
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Judge Lewis concluded that Nemetz had not met his burden of
proof regarding good moral character and denied his petition for nat-
uralization.242 In summarizing the evidence upon which he based his
conclusion, Judge Lewis stated:
The petitioner concedes having actively engaged in sexual relations
with his male roommate, more or less continuously, since 1967. It
was further conceded that these sexual relations took place in private
between consenting adults. He was never asked whether he had ever
engaged in sexual acts constituting sodomy, proscribed by § 18.2-361
of the Code of Virginia.243
Despite the absence of direct evidence that specific illegal acts
occurred, the Court found that an admission of sexual relations was
sufficient evidence to raise a presumption of illegal sodomy. Silence
on the part of the petitioner was insufficient to rebut the
presumption. 2 4
The logic in this case can be summarized as follows:
1. Nemetz engaged in monogamous, private, consensual sexual
relations with another male.
2. The court will infer that this conduct constituted sodomy.
3. Sodomy is a crime of moral turpitude.
4. Thus, anyone who engages in same-sex sexual conduct is pre-
sumed to be of bad moral character.
Fortunately, the case was reversed on appeal.245 Recognizing that
the burden of proof regarding good moral character was on the peti-
tioner and that the trial court had (perhaps correctly) inferred that
the petitioner had committed the crime of consensual sodomy, the
242 Id.
243 Id. at 470.
244 See Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981), which reversed Judge Lewis, and
explained his reasoning as follows:
In this case, the Service Examiner recommended that Nemetz be denied
naturalization because Nemetz had not sustained his burden of proof on the good moral
character issue. The district court agreed, finding that Nemetz had failed to rebut the
inference that he had committed sodomy in violation of Virginia law, see, Va.Code
§ 18.2-361; this inference arose from Nemetz's admission that he had had homosexual
relations with his roommate. Under the district court's analysis, Nemetz's failure to
rebut that inference constituted a failure to meet his burden of proof on the issue of
good moral character.
Id. at 435.
245 Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 437.
1594 [Vol. 79:1551
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  1594 1993
Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit elected to attack the logic of
the lower court's decision at step three above---"sodomy is a crime of
moral turpitude." Reasoning that "whether a person is of good moral
character for purposes of naturalization is a question of federal law,"
the court pointed to the lack of uniformity amongst the states regard-
ing the criminalization of private consensual sodomy. 246 To construct
a uniform federal standard, the court concluded that private sexual
conduct might be viewed as an act of "moral turpitude" if it had a
public harmful effect.2 47 Because private consensual homosexual sod-
omy has no such effect,248 the petitioner was found to have met his
burden regarding good moral character. Despite this positive out-
come for petitioner in Nemetz, it is important to remember that both
the trial and the appellate courts were willing to infer the commission
of criminal sodomy from the admission of a sexual relationship.
b. The Military Cases
Although Norton v. Macy 2 49 had established the principle that the
government could not generally cite homosexuality as a grounds for
dismissing its employees without showing some rational connection
between homosexuality and job performance, that principle had never
been extended to military employees. In 1975, Leonard Matlovich 5 0
voluntarily revealed to the Secretary of the Air Force that he was a
246 Id. at 435.
247 Id. at 436.
248 Id. at 437. Private sex, even consensual homosexual sodomy, might be harmful to public
interests under the court's analysis if one of the parties was married. In that case the act would
constitute adultery, which has public consequences in that "extramarital intercourse ... tends
to destroy an existing marriage; which evidences disregard of marital vows and
responsibilities." Id. at 436 (quoting Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1964)).
249 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
250 Matlovich had served with honor and distinction for twelve years in the U.S. Air Force.
Judge Gesell described him as follows:
Here is a man who volunteered for assignment to Viet Nam, who served in Viet Nam
with distinction, who was awarded the Bronze Star while only an Airman First Class,
engaged in hazardous duty on a volunteer basis on more than one occasion, wounded in
a mine explosion, revolunteered, has excelled in the Service as a training officer, as a
counselling officer and in the various social action programs and race-relation programs
of the military, and has at all times been rated at the highest possible ratings by his
superiors in all aspects of his performance, receiving in addition to the Bronze Star, the
Purple Heart, two Air Force Commendation Medals and a Meritorious Service Medal.
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,325 at 6089 (D.D.C.
Aug. 25, 1976), vacated, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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homosexual and had engaged in private consensual homosexual sex-
ual activity while enlisted in the Air Force.251 He requested that he
not be dismissed under the Air Force's then existing rules, which gen-
erally dismissed service personnel for homosexuality.2 2 After a four-
day hearing, the Administrative Discharge Board "recommended that
he be given a general discharge for unfitness, based on his homosexual
acts. ' 2 3 The discharge was upgraded to "honorable" by his com-
manding officer.254
Matlovich appealed the discharge in federal court. While the case
was under consideration by District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell,
the Supreme Court issued its summary affirmance in Doe. Citing
Doe, Judge Gesell dismissed the constitutional arguments raised by
Matlovich, finding that he had no constitutional right to engage in
homosexual sodomy.255 He next considered whether the Air Force
regulation generally requiring homosexuals to be discharged could
withstand rational basis review. Without ever specifically identifying
what the legitimate governmental interest was in barring homosexuals
from the military, as required by Norton, the court concluded that the
regulation was not "so irrational that it may be branded arbitrary. 256
This case was the first to hold that, because criminal laws against
homosexual sodomy were constitutional under due process analysis,
251 The background of the Matlovich case is described in exquisite detail in Shilts, supra
note 9, at 194-95, 198-200, 202-04, 207-08, 210-11, 216-17. Of particular interest is the
reaction of Matlovich's military attorney, who initially reacted by saying: "Why did you write
this letter? I could have gotten you out." Matlovich's response was that he didn't want to get
out. He wanted to challenge the entire policy. Id. at 208.
For a specific description of the admitted sexual conduct, see supra note 233.
252 The rules in force at that time were summarized by Judge Gesell as follows:
Homosexuality is not tolerated in the Air Force. There is no distinction between
duty time and off-duty time as the high moral standards of the service must be
maintained at all times.
It is the general policy to discharge members of the Air Force who fall within the
purview of this section. Exceptions to permit retention may be authorized only where
the most unusual circumstances exist and provided the airman's ability to perform
military service has not been compromised.
Matlovich, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6089.
253 The facts are explained in Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 854.
254 Id.
255 Matlovich, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CC-1) at 6088.
256 Id. at 6090. The opinion was delivered orally from the bench and thus may have lacked
the detailed explanation that a written decision might have contained. Judge Gesell did refer
at length to the Air Force hearings at which the rationale behind the ban was no doubt
discussed. He also reinforced the notion that it was appropriate to give some deference to
1596 [Vol. 79:1551
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governmental discrimination against homosexuals would not violate
equal protection unless a plaintiff could show that the discrimination
was irrational. More military cases followed Matlovich. The combi-
nation of low level, "rational basis" review and judicial deference to
the military produced a string of litigation losses.257 Although some
courts, despite Doe, were willing to recognize some sort of privacy
right in consensual homosexual conduct, they nonetheless consist-
ently held that the military's interest in regulating homosexual
conduct outweighed the privacy rights of the individual ser-
vicemember. 258  Only one pre-Hardwick military decision, the Dis-
trict Court opinion in BenShalom v. Secretary of the Army 25 9 avoided
the homosexual conduct problem posed by Doe by distinguishing sex-
military decisions of this sort and pled with the military to reconsider its position, noting that
"this is a distressing case." Id. at 6090-91.
For a more fully reasoned opinion holding that the Navy regulations banning homosexuality
(which were similar to the Air Force regulations in Matlovich) are constitutional, see Judge
Gesell's initial opinion in Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76, 79-81 (1977), vacated and
remanded, 591 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1978), decided at about the same time.
257 The Matlovich and Berg cases were consolidated at the appellate level. The D.C. Circuit
did not address the constitutional issues, holding instead that the Air Force and the Navy had
failed to explain adequately why these two men had been dismissed under the then
discretionary policy of dismissal for homosexuality. See Berg, 591 F.2d at 851; Matlovich, 591
F.2d at 855. On remand, Gesell ordered reinstatement for both men. Matlovich v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) % 31,254, at 17,624 (D.D.C. 1980). To avoid
reinstatement the Defense Department offered both men a cash settlement to drop the case.
Shilts, supra note 9, at 363. Ultimately, upon the advice of their attorneys and in light of
increasing hostility to gay cases in the federal courts, both men accepted the offer. Id. at 365-
71. The decision was harder for Matlovich because he sincerely loved the military and wanted
to stay in. Id.
The string of losses in military cases included Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.
1984) and Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981).
258 See, e.g., Belier, 632 F.2d at 809-10 (holding that the government interests outweigh
whatever privacy interests may exist); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228
(10th Cir. 1984) (concluding that even if constitutionally protected interests were implicated,
the Army's interests outweighed them); Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376,
1382-83 (finding that whatever autonomy rights exist are outweighed by the importance of the
military setting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). These cases are also discussed in Richard
B. Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice,
and Dronenberg v. Zech, 10 Dayton L. Rev. 767, 771 n.21 (1985). To the extent any of these
cases accorded heightened scrutiny to homosexual sodomy, they have been effectively reversed
by Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that homosexual sodomy is entitled to
mere rational basis review).
259 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 776 F.2d 1049
(1985) (per curiam).
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ual preference from conduct and finding constitutional protection for
the former.26"
Of the military cases decided after Doe and before Hardwick, only
two cases were litigated as pure "status" cases.261 Miriam BenShalom
identified herself as a lesbian, but did not admit to any specific sexual
conduct. Nor was there any evidence of sexual conduct in her case.
BenShalom won her case and was reinstated.262 James Woodward
also self-identified as gay in Woodward v. Moore.263 As reported by
the District Court:
In September, 1974, after Woodward was seen in an officers' club
associating with an enlisted man who was being separated from duty
for homosexual activities, he admitted to his commanding officer that
he had homosexual tendencies. Because of these matters plaintiff was
requested to resign. He refused to do so, explaining that he wanted to
finish his term of obligated service.2 4
Woodward never admitted to any sexual conduct and no evidence of
sexual conduct was proffered. He was removed from active duty and
the action was validated by the District Court.26 Although the Navy
was subsequently ordered to reconsider this decision in light of the
260 Id. at 975.
261 The two cases are BenShalom and Woodward v. Moore, 451 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990). In addition, see Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546 F. Supp. 1221
(C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving litigation over
award of attorney's fees against the Navy and in favor of a woman who had been threatened
with discharge after confessing lesbian tendencies to a psychiatrist; she had obtained full relief
from the Board for the Correction of Naval Records, thereby removing her substantive
complaint against the Navy from the district court's consideration).
262 BenShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 977. The government dropped its appeal, but nonetheless
refused to reinstate BenShalom. She brought a writ of mandamus action to require
reinstatement and the Seventh Circuit ruled in her favor. BenShalom v. Secretary of the
Army, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987). However, after winning this first round of litigation and
earning recognition as the only lesbian to be reinstated after challenging the military
regulations, she found herself faced with a second round of litigation when her enlistment
expired. The army refused to allow her to reenlist, forcing her to sue again. She won at the
district court level, which ordered reenlistment, but the holding was reversed by the court of
appeals. BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
263 451 F. Supp. 346.
264 Id. at 347.
265 Id. at 349.
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Matlovich and Berg cases,2 66 the Navy refused to reinstate him.267
Woodward's appeal of this decision occured in the post-Hardwick
years and was not concluded until 1990 when the Supreme Court ulti-
mately denied certiorari.
The other pre-Hardwick military cases involved admissions of sex-
ual activity, rarely described with much specificity,26 and in at least
one case, proof of criminal sodomy.269 Because these cases were liti-
gated in the pre-Hardwick era, during a time in which many litigators
believed that, despite Doe, private consensual sexual conduct enjoyed
266 Woodward v. Moore, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 695, at 696 (D.D.C. Mar. 13,
1991) (reasoning that under Matlovich and Berg, the Secretary of the Navy may consider
homosexuality as a grounds for removal from active duty, but must nonetheless give reasons
for doing so in individual cases); see supra note 257 for a discussion of Matlovich and Berg.
At the time, the military's policy against gays allowed for the discretionary retention of
some gays. That policy was changed in 1981 when the Department of Defense issued directive
1332.14 (revised and reissued in 1982), announcing a policy against retaining any homosexuals
in the service. See 32 C.F.R. § 41 (1982). For a brief discussion of this history, see Sexual
Orientation and the Law § 6.02[2] (Roberta Achtenberg & Barbara J. Gilchrist eds., 1992).
267 See Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding the Navy's
decision), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
268 The Matlovich case gives the most specific description of sexual conduct. See supra note
233. As reported in the other cases, service members admitted the following conduct:
On appeal, Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981), was consolidated with two other cases, Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) and Miller (unreported). The conduct in the case of Mary Saal was an admission of
homosexual relations and an indication "that she intended to continue her homosexual
relationship." 632 F.2d at 793. No specific sexual acts were described. Plaintiff Miller
"admitted that he had participated recently in homosexual acts with two Taiwanese natives
while he was stationed in Taiwan." 632 F.2d at 794. The acts were not further specified.
Beller admitted that he had "engaged in sex with males." Id. The specific type of sex is not
described.
In Berg, the court stated that "Berg signed a statement admitting to participation in
homosexual activity both before and during his service in the Navy," although the exact nature
of that activity is never described. 436 F. Supp. at 78-79.
The appellant in Dronenberg, was found to have "repeatedly engaged in homosexual
conduct in a barracks on the Navy base." 741 F.2d at 1389.
Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) was a fraudulent enlistment
case based on the service member's revelation to superiors that he was gay. Rich fought the
discharge, claiming that his sexual identity was not fully formed when he enlisted. He had
been married and fathered a son. He made the following statement regarding sexual identity:
"My earlier experience had been heterosexual followed by isolated episodes with my own sex."
Id. at 1223. No specific sexual conduct was identified and the court relied primarily on
declarations of gay identity to uphold the discharge.
269 Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 864 (1981). Hatheway had been convicted of homosexual sodomy under the
military's sodomy law.
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some constitutional protection,270 conduct was freely admitted. Liti-
gation strategy in military cases was to emphasize the private and
consensual nature of the conduct, as well as its irrelevance to job
performance.271
c. Other Public Employment
Provided public employees could show a property or liberty interest
in their jobs, Norton v. Macy guaranteed them some minimal degree
of protection under the due process clause. Under Norton, even if an
employee had engaged in homosexual conduct, due process required
the employer to show that the conduct affected the employee's job
performance before the employee could be fired.
A different due process argument was required for public employ-
ees who could not prove the requisite property or liberty interest in
their jobs. For example, a job applicant whose application was
refused on grounds of the applicant's homosexual conduct would not
be able to show the requisite property or liberty interest in the sought-
after job. The job applicant would have no more than a mere expecta-
tion in the job, and mere expectations are not property.272 The job
applicant's constitutional claim would have to be based on a due pro-
cess theory different from that of Norton. In particular the job appli-
cant would have to argue that the job denial punished constitutionally
protected homosexual conduct. Doe's failure to protect homosexual
conduct from criminal prosecution made it easier for post-Doe cases
to deny protection to homosexuals who merely lost job opportunities
as a consequence of engaging in criminal sexual conduct.
In Childers v. Dallas Police Department,273 a federal district court
upheld the defendant's decision not to hire plaintiff, an "admitted[ ]
270 At least some courts apparently agreed. See supra note 258.
271 Matlovich, for example, initially declined to answer questions about sexual conduct,
Shilts, supra note 9, at 203, but later described the conduct as private and never with service
personnel. See supra note 233; see also Berg, 591 F.2d at 850 (admitting to homosexual
activity but denying alleged conduct with an enlisted sailor).
272 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (discussing how due process
rights apply to property interests but not to mere expectations); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 599 (1972) (same).
273 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982). Childers was a
case brought by the ACLU.
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homosexual, ' 274 for the the property division of the police depart-
ment. Noting that "[t]he police department has no policy regarding
sexual preference, only sexual practice, ' 271 the court concluded that
"Childers was not hired because of his active and frequent homosex-
ual conduct. ' 276 The court thus avoided the argument that pure sta-
tus might be entitled to constitutional protection by concluding that
homosexual conduct, not status, was at issue.
The plaintiff made two constitutional claims that required the court
to focus on the offending conduct, a substantive due process claim and
a First Amendment claim.277 Both claims were rejected by the court
in a decision that is next to impossible to decipher because the
description of the offending conduct is so horribly muddled. For
example, according to the court's own statement of the facts at the
beginning of the case, the only homosexual conduct known to the
police department at the time it decided not to hire Childers was his
admission that he was gay, that he was a member of the Metropolitan
Community Church ("MCC"), 278 that he had a "spouse," and that he
had taken part in gay pride marches as well as other demonstrations
in favor of gay rights.279 Furthermore, despite the fact that "Childers
refused to answer interrogatories and deposition questions about his
relationship with Donald Armstrong, '280 the court concluded that
"[t]he overriding reason that the Plaintiff was not hired was because
he admitted to engaging in homosexual conduct prohibited by Texas
penal statutes and was thereby in violation of police department regu-
lations."28 ' The judge did not explain how he came to this conclu-
sion, nor when it was that plaintiff admitted to criminal consensual
274 Id. at 136. Childers admitted to both homosexual preference and homosexual practice.
Id. Although the court does not say exactly what sex acts Childers admitted, the court does
say that Childers admitted to sexual conduct that violated the Texas sodomy statute. Id. at
147 n.21.
275 Id. at 147 n.20.
276 Id.
277 There was also a procedural due process claim, which was rejected because the court
found no property or liberty interest at stake. Id. at 143-45. An equal protection claim was
rejected as well. Id. at 147 n.22.
278 MCC is a church whose ministry is directed to the lesbian and gay community. Id. at
137.
279 Id. at 137-38.
280 Id. at 145 n.17. Donald Armstrong was the man Childers had referred to as his
"spouse."
281 Id. at 142-43 n.13.
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sodomy. And if the revelation occurred at trial, as seems most plausi-
ble,282 the judge never explained how this subsequent revelation was
sufficient grounds for the department's decision not to hire Childers,
which had obviously been made earlier.
Claiming that Childers was rejected because he engaged in criminal
sodomy certainly made it easier for the court to deny the substantive
due process claim. The court initially concluded that Doe was dispos-
itive because the Court in that case had apparently determined there
was no "special constitutional protection" for homosexual sodomy.283
Alternatively, the Childers court reasoned that even if there were spe-
cial constitutional protection against criminal prosecution for homo-
sexual conduct,284 the police department need only meet the lower
rational basis test to support its decision not to hire Childers:
The situation here is not one where the State is seeking to use its
criminal processes to coerce persons to comply with the moral judg-
ments of the majority. Instead, this case requires only an assessment
of a police departments' [sic] actions in refusing to hire into a sensi-
tive position one whose conduct was inflagrant violation of police reg-
ulations. As such, this Court need only determine whether the police
department's actions were rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment end. I conclude that the government's interests far outweigh
any interest Childers had in constitutional protection for his homo-
sexual behavior.285
If the court is referring to criminal consensual sodomy as the rele-
vant conduct, then it is not clear how such conduct was in flagrant
violation of the regulations. The conduct did not occur in public.
Childers was never arrested for such conduct. Nor did he talk about
such conduct in public. The only possible "flagrant conduct" in evi-
dence was Childers's participation in gay rights demonstrations. The
282 Childers was an activist an was represented by the ACLU in this litigation. One of their
claims at trial was that the Texas sodomy statute was unconstitutional in that it violated
Childers's privacy rights. To make this claim, Childers presumably was willing to admit to
conduct covered by the statute.
283 Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 146.
284 Childers argued that the summary affirmance in Doe had not finally decided the
constitutional issue regarding his right to privacy claim. He argued, as did other post-Doe
plaintiffs, that the Court's subsequent decision in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977), indicated that a plurality of the Court had not yet decided what the limits to the right
of privacy were and that the right might well extend to all private consensual behavior among
adults. Id.
285 Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
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court appears to conflate status and sexual conduct by suggesting that
one who is "flagrant" (i.e., conspicuously open)28 6 about one's status
is also "flagrant" about one's sexual conduct.
This conflation of status and conduct is even more apparent in the
court's rational basis analysis:
There is legitimate concern about tension between known and active
homosexuals and others who detest homosexuals. There are also
legitimate doubts about a homosexual's ability to gain the trust and
respect of the personnel with whom he works. Moreover, the police
department could rationally conclude that tolerance of homosexual
conduct might be construed as tacit approval, rendering the police
department subject to approbation [sic] and causing interference with
the effective performance of its function.287
The first two sentences in this passage are obviously about homosex-
ual status rather than conduct. The last sentence refers to homosex-
ual conduct without specifying the type of conduct. It is difficult to
understand how the police department could be viewed as tolerating
private consensual sexual conduct of which it had no direct knowl-
edge. Perhaps the court meant that toleration of "known homosexu-
als" might be construed as tacit approval of homosexual sexual
conduct.
Childers was a known homosexual because he willingly revealed his
sexual orientation. He also was active in the gay community and
admitted to marching in two gay pride parades. These facts were
known at the time he applied for the job with the police department.
No specific facts were known at that time about his sexual conduct.
Thus, it seems unlikely that the decision not to hire him was based on
sexual conduct. The court's due process constitutional analysis
should have focused on the real reason for the governmental decision,
that Childers was too open about his sexual orientation.
The court did focus on this reason for the police department's rejec-
tion of Childers when it analyzed his First Amendment claim. In
denying the claim, the court emphasized the differences between those
cases in which governmental employees were too open about their
286 "Flagrant" means conspicuous, but it also carries a particularly negative connotation.
Thus, it means being conspicuously open in a negative, rather than positive, way. See
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 862-63 (1972).
287 Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 147.
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homosexuality and those cases in which they were not,2"' and noted
that only plaintiffs in the latter category won their cases. "A careful
reading of [the 'winning'] cases will demonstrate.., that in none of
the cases was any substantial overt homosexual conduct involved. 28 9
Losing plaintiffs, by contrast, lost because they openly and publicly
flaunted their homosexuality.290 In particular, public flaunting seems
to include gay men applying for marriage licenses.291 One losing
plaintiff once kissed another man in public.292 Like Childers, other
losing litigants had participated in gay rights demonstrations.293
The Childers court accurately summarized the difference between
cases in which gay and lesbian employees won job protection and
those in which they lost. 294 To win, an employee must have remained
as closeted as possible. Speaking out publicly can result in loss of
employment despite the fact that such speech warrants a certain
degree of First Amendment protection.295 Generally speaking, public
employees are limited by the legitimate interests of their employers in
protecting the public's image of the employer.2 96
288 Id. at 141. Plaintiffs were too open in Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530
F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), and McConnell v.
Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972). Plaintiff was
sufficiently discreet when hired in Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 483 (D.Md. 1973),
aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 836 (1974), and throughout in Aumiller v.
University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
289 Childers, 513 F. Supp at 147 n.20. The court puts Acanfora and Aumiller in this
category as well. Id. at 141 n.10.
290 See Singer, 530 F.2d at 256; McConnell, 451 F.2d at 196.
291 Singer, 530 F.2d at 249; McConnell, 451 F.2d at 195.
292 Singer, 530 F.2d at 249.
293 See Singer and McConnell. See also Aumiller, 434 F. Supp. at 1293 (pointing out that
Aumiller had not engaged in comparable public conduct and was thus entitled to protection.)
The Childers court cites Aumiller for this point. Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 141 n.10.
294 However, the Childers court may have unduly relied on Singer, in light of the fact that
Singer was vacated and remanded.
The continuing vitality of Singer is questionable because it was vacated and remanded
by the Supreme Court, based on the Solicitor General's suggestion that the action of the
CSC should be reconsidered in light of recently adopted changes in the Civil Service
Personnel'Manual which greatly restricted the ability of the CSC to base employment
decisions on considerations of homosexuality.
Aumiller, 434 F. Supp. at 1294.
295 Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 140.
296 Compare Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-74 (1968) (protecting an
employee's speech if the speech is about matters of public concern) with Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 153-54 (1983) (upholding employer's sanction of employee where the employee's
speech was about matters of only personal interest). See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech
1604
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The story of Marjorie Rowland is another case in point.2 97 Row-
land, a high school guidance counselor, confided in a co-worker that
she was bisexual and currently in a lesbian relationship. Shortly
thereafter she was transferred to a new post. Ultimately, her contract
was terminated. 298
The trier of fact specifically found that "but for" her private expres-
sions regarding her sexual preference, Rowland's employment would
not have been terminated.299 On this basis, the District Court ruled in
her favor, both on First Amendment and equal protection grounds.3°°
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding neither a
violation of Rowland's free speech rights nor a violation of her equal
protection rights.30 1
In the court's view, Rowland was fired, at least in part, for talking
about the fact that she was bisexual. And, although such talk may
look a lot like "speech," this particular talk was not speech protected
by the First Amendment because it was private speech unrelated to
issues of public concern.30 2 Furthermore, as to the equal protection
issue, the Court of Appeals found that the jury's findings of fact did
not specify whether she had been fired for being a bisexual or for talk-
ing about it.30 3 The court obviously presumed no equal protection
on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (discussing the development and implications for First Amendment
law of these two cases).
297 See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
298 See id. at 446 for a discussion of the facts of the case.
299 Id. at 447-48.
300 Id. at 448.
301 Id. at 451-52.
302 Id. at 449 (relying on Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
303 Id. at 450. The court also claimed that there was insufficient evidence for the fact finder
to conclude that heterosexuals would have been treated differently because plaintiff failed to
introduce any evidence of how heterosexuals were treated. Id. This was certainly careless
lawyering, although one can understand how a lawyer might hesitate to put the employer on
the stand and ask: "And how do you treat your heterosexual employees when they reveal their
sexual orientation in private?" The reason the question sounds silly is that the heterosexual
presumption relieves most heterosexuals from having to state explicitly what their sexual
preference or orientation is. There are, however, countless less explicit ways in which private
sexual facts about preference are revealed. For example, whenever an employee announces an
engagement, a wedding, or a date with a person of the opposite sex, the person is identifying
herself or himself as heterosexual. Presumably there were many employees who had made
such indirect confessions of heterosexuality and were not fired as a result. One wonders why
the court thought it necessary for plaintiff to prove how heterosexuals were treated.
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violation would have occurred in the event she had been fired primar-
ily for talking about it.3°4
Rowland presented an opportunity for the United States Supreme
Court to clarify what its summary affirmance in Doe meant and to
pronounce a clear rule regarding the constitutional rights of gay men
and lesbians.3°5 Rowland was a particularly appealing case to take to
the Supreme Court because it raised both equal protection and First
Amendment claims, as well as questions about the dividing line
between status and conduct. The privacy claim that lay at the heart of
the Doe case was not directly implicated in Rowland, but it would
have been appropriate for the Court to have discussed, within the con-
text of the equal protection and First Amendment claims, whether
consensual lesbian sex fell within the privacy penumbra.
The Rowland petition for certiorari was before the Court shortly
before certiorari was granted in Hardwick.3 6 The Court denied the
petition in Rowland with only Justices William J. Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall dissenting.3 °7 In his written dissent, Justice Bren-
nan stated that "[w]hether constitutional rights are infringed in sexual
preference cases, and whether some compelling state interest can be
advanced to permit their infringement, are important questions that
this Court has never addressed, and which have left the lower courts
in some disarray. "308
304 Id. The court found other reasons to reverse the equal protection holding of the District
Court. See supra note 303. But had it not done so, it would have remanded to determine the
primary motivation for the action against Rowland. Was she fired for being gay or for talking
about it? See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 450 (indicating that it was impossible on appeal to know
whether the jury's decison was based on being gay or talking about it).
305 Following its summary affirmance in Doe, the Supreme Court had decided another
privacy case, Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), in which the court left open
the possibility that Griswold might reach far enough to protect private homosexual sexual
conduct. Id at 688 n.5. State and federal courts relied on Carey to question the precedential
authority of Doe. See Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 n.8 (10th Cir. 1984)
(discussing state and federal cases that consider Carey's effect on Doe).
306 Certiorari was denied in Rowland on February 25, 1985, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), and
rehearing on the certiorari peitition was denied April 22, 1985. 471 U.S. 1062 (1985). The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Hardwick on May 21, 1985, 760 F.2d 1202
(lth Cir. 1985), and certiorari was granted on November 4, 1985. 474 U.S. 943 (1985).
307 Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1009. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision.
308 Id. at 1015-16.
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Instead of granting certiorari to answer these important questions,
the Court waited and granted certiorari in Hardwick,31 a case posing
only the substantive due process question: Does Griswold extend to
private consensual same-sex sexual conduct? The Hardwick Court
answered no to this question, leaving the courts in continued disarray
as to the First Amendment and equal protection questions.
Shortly after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rowland, it
summarily affirmed a Tenth Circuit opinion dealing with the constitu-
tionality of the regulation of public speech about homosexuality.310
National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City,3"
was a constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma statute that authorized
dismissal of teachers for engaging in "public homosexual conduct or
activity.' 31 2 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld that
portion of the statute related to public sexual conduct defined as activ-
ity,3"3 but struck down that portion of the statute related to public
homosexual conduct defined as "advocating, soliciting, imposing,
encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity."3 14
The court found that the statute would permit a teacher to be fired for
309 In May 1993 new information, derived from Justice Marshall's papers, about the
certiorari decision in Hardwick was made public. Whereas Justices Brennan and Marshall had
voted to grant certiorari in the Rowland case (an anti-gay rights decision), only Justice Byron
R. White and Chief Justice Warren Burger, in the first round of voting, favored the granting of
certiorari in Hardwick (a pro-gay rights decision). If Justices Brennan and Marshall signed
on, the vote in favor of certiorari would be four, the requisite amount. At the time, the only
meaningful indication of the Justices' individual positions on gay rights issues was the per
curiam opinion in National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 470 U.S. 903
(1985), in which the vote was four to four with Justice Powell not participating. Powell
apparently indicated that he might be willing to side with the four other pro-gay votes in the
Hardwick case. This possibility for a pro-gay ruling tempted both Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall to vote in favor of granting certiorari. In the end, however, Justice Brennan backed
down, afraid that the ultimate decision by the Court was likely to reverse the pro-gay decision
below. Then Justice Rehnquist signed on to grant certiorari and a fourth vote was needed.
Justice Marshall decided to take the risk and signed on as the necessary fourth vote. The risk
did not pay off as Justice Marshall had hoped because Justice Powell decided to vote with the
conservatives to uphold the Georgia sodomy law. After retirement, Justice Powell publicly
recanted, stating that he probably should have voted against the sodomy law. See Neil A.
Lewis, Rare Glimpses of Judicial Chess and Poker, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1993, at Al; Chris
Bull, A Hard Look at Hardwick, The Advocate, June 29, 1993, at 31-32.
310 National Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (per curiam), aff'g 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.
1984).
311 729 F.2d 1270.
312 Id. at 1272.
313 Id. at 1273.
314 Id. at 1274.
1993] 1607
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  1607 1993
Virginia Law Review
advocating changes in the law regarding private homosexual sexual
activity. 15 Such a result would be contrary to First Amendment
principles, despite the fact that teachers are considered to have
restricted First Amendment rights. 6
Despite these holdings, the case presented no issues regarding pri-
vate sexual conduct or private speech. Furthermore, because the stat-
ute was facially attacked as overbroad, it is not clear where the Tenth
Circuit would draw the line on protected public speech by teachers
regarding homosexuality. And because the Supreme Court rendered
no opinion in the case, it is not clear what the Court's reasoned view
of the matter is.
d. Recognition of Student Organizations
The one area in which Doe failed to have any meaningful negative
impact was in litigation over university recognition of gay and lesbian
student organizations. The first gay and lesbian student organization
was formed in 1967 at Columbia University. It was chartered as the
Student Homophile League and received sufficient media attention to
encourage the formation of similar groups at Cornell, New York Uni-
versity, and Stanford. 7 The formation of such groups at more con-
servative state universities caused a certain degree of consternation for
university presidents and regents who had to answer to the state's
taxpayers. For example, when a student group formed the Commit-
tee on Gay Education at the University of Georgia, the university
responded by changing its rules regarding the recognition of student
organizations. Whereas the university had previously required stu-
dent organizations to seek "recognition" and "approval," the rules
were changed to require no more than "registration" of all student
organizations. 18 When the university denied the student group's
request to host a conference and a dance, however, the group brought
suit in federal district court. Wood v. Davison 31 9 is the first reported
315 Id.
316 Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
317 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 11, at 209-10.
318 See Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543, 545 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
319 Id. Wood cites an unreported California trial court opinion in favor of a similar gay and
lesbian student group. Id. at 546 (citing Associated Students of Sacramento State College v.
Butz (Super. Ct. 1971)).
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case recognizing the First Amendment associational fights of a gay
and lesbian student group.
Other decisions followed, all ultimately ruling in favor of the gay
and lesbian student group. 320 Gay Students Organization of the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire v. Bonner 3 21 emphasized that official recog-
nition alone was not sufficient protection of First Amendment
associational rights.3 22 The university must also support the organi-
zation's social activities, including dances.3 23 Although some univer-
sity officials objected to social events sponsored by gay and lesbian
student groups on the grounds that the events might lead to criminal
activity (i.e., consensual sodomy),324 this objection was uniformly dis-
missed in decisions handed down both before and after the summary
affirmance in Doe.325 In the student organization cases, therefore,
320 See Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 658-63 (Ist Cir. 1974)
(holding that university's efforts to restrict campus social functions of gay and lesbian student
organization violated First Amendment protections of the right to associate); Gay Alliance of
Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 165-67 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that university's refusal
to register gay student organization violated First and Fourteenth Amendments); Gay Lib v.
University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 852-57 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that First Amendment rights
were violated when university refused to recognize homosexual student organization even if
the organization would tend to perpetuate or expand homosexual behavior), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1080 (1978); Gay Activists Alliance v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 638 P.2d 1116,
1122-23 (Okla. 1981) (holding that student group has First Amendment right to organize and
be recognized by university); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1324-
33 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing First Amendment right of association), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1001 (1985); Student Services for Lesbians/Gays and Friends v. Texas Tech Univ., 635 F.
Supp. 776, 781-82 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (holding university officials not liable for damages for
initial failure to recognize gay student group because law not was sufficiently clear until
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Texas A & M case).
321 509 F.2d 652.
322 Id. at 658-59.
323 "Considering the important role that social events can play in individuals' efforts to
associate to further their common beliefs, the prohibition of all social events must be taken to
be a substantial abridgment of associational rights, even if assumed to be an indirect one." Id.
at 659-60.
324 See e.g., id. at 662; Wood, 351 F. Supp. at 546 n.5.
32 Georgia had a statute prohibiting sodomy at the time Wood was decided, but the court
refused to assume that a student social affair would lead to criminal activity. Wood, 351 F.
Supp. at 548.
New Hampshire also prohibited sodomy at the time of the Bonner decision, but the First
Circuit dismissed the university's concern about inappropriate behavior, stating:
[I]f a university chose to do so, it might well be able to regulate overt sexual behavior,
short of criminal activity, which may offend the community's sense of propriety, so long
as it acts in a fair and equitable manner. The point in this case is that the district court
has found no improper conduct, and it does not appear that the university ever
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noncriminal conduct by homosexuals such as talking about their lifes-
tyles and socializing with others was fully protected. Nor was it
assumed that where homosexuals might gather for social purposes,
criminal activity was likely to follow.
The student organization cases are interesting because they
occurred at a time when university employees could be fired for
speaking out on gay rights issues.326 Although students have histori-
cally enjoyed fewer constitutional rights than other members of soci-
ety,327 their right to form gay and lesbian organizations has been
consistently upheld under the First Amendment. The gay student
group cases succeeded in part because they relied on earlier cases sup-
porting recognition of other unpopular student groups.3 28 University
employees, by contrast, were hindered by the Supreme Court's recog-
nition that the speech of public employees could be limited under a
concerned itself with defining or regulating such behavior. Defendants sought to cut
back GSO's social activities simply because sponsored by that group. The ban was not
justified by any evidence of misconduct attributable to GSO, and it was altogether too
sweeping.
Bonner, 509 F.2d at 663.
Gay Alliance involved a student organization in Virginia. Citing to the Virginia statute and
to Doe, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless found:
There is no evidence that GAS is an organization devoted to carrying out illegal, specifi-
cally proscribed sexual practices....
It follows that even if affording GAS registration does increase the opportunity for
homosexual contacts, that fact is insufficient to overcome the associational rights of
members of GAS. Given the right to exclude individuals who are convicted of practic-
ing proscribed forms of homosexuality, or whose homosexual conduct, although not
proscribed, materially and substantially disrupts the work and discipline at VCU, the
suppression of associational rights because the opportunity for homosexual contacts is
increased constitutes prohibited overbreadth.
Gay Alliance, 544 F.2d at 166 (citations omitted).
326 See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 194 (8th Cir. 1971) (offer of
employment as university librarian withdrawn after male plaintiff and another mal6 applied for
a marriage license), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
327 Students' First Amendment rights were recognized in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-14 (1969), and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180
(1972). See generally Charles Allen Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev.
1027 (1969) (arguing that the Consitution, and in particular the First Amendment, should
apply to college campuses).
328 See, e.g., Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (involving students for a Democrative Society, a left wing
student group); University of S. Miss. Chapter of MCLU v. University of S. Miss., 452 F.2d
564 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving university chapter of the Mississippi Civil Liberties Union,
which was active in civil rights litigation); American Civil Liberties Union of Va. v. Radford
College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D.Va. 1970) (involving Radford College chapter of the
American Civil Liberties Union).
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balancing test that considered the employer's interest in presenting a
differing viewpoint to the public. 29
Despite the universal success of student groups in asserting their
First Amendment associational rights, no gay student organization
case has ever been endorsed by the Supreme Court.330 As with Row-
land, these cases presented the Court with the opportunity to speak
out and clarify its position on gay rights.33 1 Nonetheless, it refused to
do so. No student organization case has raised the right of association
issue since the Court ruled negatively in Hardwick.332
329 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Estlund, supra note 296, at 4-
8.
330 None of the gay student organization cases has ever been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court for any legal point. Of greater importance is Justice Rehnquist's dissent from
the denial of certiorari in Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See infra note 331 for further discussion.
331 See Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978), denying cert. to Gay Lib v. University
of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977). Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun dissented, with
Rehnquist identifying the issue as whether a group had a First Amendment right to associate
for purposes of advocating change in the law despite the fact that the very act of association
had been found by the trier of fact to be likely to increase criminal activity. Id. at 1080-81.
Focusing on the proposed activity of the student organization, Rehnquist continued:
While [the students] disavow any intent to advocate present violations of state law, the
organization intends to engage in far more than political discussion. Among respondent
Gay Lib's asserted purposes are the following:
"3. Gay Lib wants to provide information to the vast majority of those who really
don't know what homosexuality or bi-sexual behavior really is. Too much of the
same prejudice is now directed at gay people just as it is directed at ethnic
minorities.
"4. Gay Lib does not seek to proselytize, convert, or recruit. On the other hand,
people who have already established a pattern of homosexuality when they enter
college must adjust to this fact.
"5. Gay Lib hopes to help the gay community to rid itself of its subconscious
burden of guilt. Society imprints this self-image on homosexuals and makes
adjustment with the straight world more difficult."
Expert psychological testimony below established the fact that the meeting together of
individuals who consider themselves homosexual in an officially recognized university
organization can have a distinctly different effect from the mere advocacy of repeal of
the State's sodomy statute....
... From the point of view of the University... the question is... akin to whether
those suffering from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine
regulations, to associate together and with others who do not presently have measles, in
order to urge repeal of a state law providing that measle sufferers be quarantined. The
very act of assemblage under these circumstances undercuts a significant interest of the
State which a plea for the repeal of the law would nowise do.
Id. at 1083-84.
332 But see Gay and Lesbian Student Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1988),
decided after Hardwick, in which the court held that the university's failure to fund the gay
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B. Bowers v. Hardwick
L Litigating the Case
In 1986, the issue raised in Doe was finally decided in a fully rea-
soned opinion by the United States Supreme Court. In Bowers v.
Hardwick,3 s the Court, by a vote of five to four, announced that the
constitutional right to privacy did not extend to private consensual
homosexual sodomy.3 34  Justice Byron R. White, writing for the
court, stated: "Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient
roots.
3 3 5
On August 3, 1982, Michael Hardwick was arrested by an Atlanta
policeman for committing the crime of sodomy with a consenting
adult male in the privacy of his own bedroom. The policeman making
the arrest happened upon the event solely because he was there to
issue an unrelated warrant. A slightly groggy house guest had
answered the door and waved the policeman into the home. The
policeman witnessed the commission of the crime through a slightly
ajar bedroom door. Charges were brought as a result of the arrest
and, after a hearing in the Municipal Court of Atlanta, Hardwick was
bound over to the Superior Court. At that point the District Attor-
ney's office decided not to prosecute the case further. Hardwick,336
with the help of the ACLU, decided to bring suit in federal court
asking for a declaratory judgment that the Georgia statute criminaliz-
ing sodomy was unconstitutional.337
and lesbian student group violated the First Amendment because the decision was content-
based. This case did not decide whether the university was under an obligation to recognize or
to fund the student group. But having recognized the group, the university was required to
offer it funding on the same terms as other student groups, without discrimination as to the
content of the group's political beliefs.
333 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
334 Id. at 190.
335 Id. at 192.
336 A married couple, the Does, joined the suit, claiming their marital privacy rights were
implicated as well because the Georgia statute on its face applies to married couples as well as
homosexual couples. Their claim was dismissed for lack of standing. Hardwick v. Bowers,
760 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (1 lth Cir. 1985). By contrast the court found that Michael Hardwick
had standing to challenge the statute on the basis of his "past arrest.., combined with the
continuing resolve on the part of the State to enforce the sodomy statute against homosexuals
and the authenticity of Hardwick's desire to engage in the proscribed activity in the future."
Id. at 1206.
337 The Georgia statute provided, in part:
1612 [Vol. 79:1551
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Citing Doe, the District Court dismissed Hardwick's claim.338 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, avoiding the sum-
mary affirmance in Doe by positing that the Supreme Court's action in
that case might reflect no more than its determination that the Doe
plaintiffs, unlike Hardwick, lacked standing.339 On July 25, 1985,
Georgia Attorney General Michael Bowers petitioned the Supreme
Court for discretionary review of the decision and the writ of certio-
rari was granted on November 4, 1985. 340
Michael Hardwick was represented by Kathy Wilde, an ACLU
affiliate attorney in Atlanta. Litigation strategy and the development
of arguments in the case quickly became an agenda item for the Ad
Hoe Task Force to Challenge Sodomy Laws. By 1985, the Task
Force had become an official project of Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund. National meetings of gay rights litigators included
Wilde and attorneys from other ACLU affiliates in states possessing
sodomy statutes.341 Wilde credited the Lambda project with provid-
ing a "legal think tank and a central place to discuss constitutional
theory and litigation strategies. '342
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than one nor more than 20 years.
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1984).
338 The District Court opinion is not reported, but is included in the Joint Appendix filed
with the Supreme Court briefs in the case. The opinion states:
As to plaintiff Hardwick, his arguments are foreclosed by the Supreme Court's
affirmance of a three-judge district court decision upholding the constitutionality of the
Virginia sodomy statute. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond,
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The Virginia statute
challenged in that case is quite similar to the Georgia legislation in question here, and
all the constitutional arguments made by Hardwick here were rejected in Doe.
Hardwick v. Bowers, No. C83-273A, slip op. at 18-19 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 1983).
339 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208. In finding that Doe was not dispositive, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that "'the [Supreme] Court has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private
consensual sexual] behavior among adults,'.., and we do not purport to answer that question
now." Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1209 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
688 n.5 (1977) (footnote omitted) (second alteration in original).
340 474 U.S. 943 (1985).
341 In particular, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. See Lambda Update (Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, New York, N.Y.), Winter 1985, at 5.
342 Id.
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Hardwick was not the only sodomy challenge in the court system at
that time, nor the only case on the agenda of the Ad Hoc Task Force.
Another active participant in the think tank was Jim Barber, a Dallas
attorney representing Donald Baker in a suit that challenged the
Texas sodomy statute. Although certiorari was granted in Hardwick
first, the Dallas case had been in the court system longer. Two weeks
after Michael Hardwick was arrested in August 1982,343 and well
before he filed suit in Georgia, a federal district judge in Dallas,
Texas, ruled in Baker v. Wade 344 that the Texas sodomy statute was
unconstitutional both under a right to privacy and equal protection
analysis.345 Unlike Hardwick, Baker was decided after a full trial.
Baker followed a tortuous route to the Supreme Court and thus
Hardwick landed there first.346 In discussing litigation strategy, the
Ad Hoc Task Force discussed whether the two cases should be con-
solidated at the Supreme Court level. Because the cases raised differ-
ent constitutional issues, privacy in Hardwick and equal protection
343 Hardwick was arrested on August 3, 1982. See "Statement of the Case" in Respondent's
Brief at 1, Hardwick (No. 85-140).
344 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). Baker was decided by the District Court on August 17, 1982.
553 F. Supp. at 1121.
345 Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1134-45.
3" Baker was filed by individual plaintiff Donald Baker against the District Attorney of
Dallas County, Henry Wade (the same Wade of Roe v. Wade fame) and Lee Holt, Dallas City
Attorney. In order to assure that any affirmative ruling would be binding against all law
enforcement officers in the state of Texas, the class of defendants included all city, county, and
district attorneys in the State of Texas. The State of Texas intervened via its Attorney
General. All city, county and district attorneys were notified of their right to intervene and
not one of them elected to do so. Thus Wade and Holt were certified as the class
representatives for the defendant class. When the plaintiff won, all then existing members of
the class of defendants were given notice. Danny Hill, a newly elected District Attorney of
Potter County, then filed a motion to intervene. Initially the Attorney General filed notice of
appeal, but then withdrew the notice. District Attorney Hill then asked the Texas Supreme
Court to require the Attorney General to file an appeal. The Texas Supreme Court refused.
Hill then pursued a direct appeal on his own, asking the Fifth Circuit to reverse the pro-gay
decision of the District Court. The panel decision held that Hill was not a proper
representative of the class and thus had no legal standing to challenge the lower court opinion.
Upon reconsideration en banc, the Fifth Circuit ruled (9 to 7) that Hill was a proper party and
that, on the authority of Doe the district court must be reversed. See Baker, 769 F.2d at 291-
92, for a discussion of the history of the case. After the rehearing was denied, Baker filed a
certiorari peitition with the Supreme Court, a petition that reached the court while Hardwick
was under consideration.
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in Baker,347 it was thought preferable to keep the arguments sep-
arate.318 The opportunity to argue Baker never arose, however. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Baker only a week after handing
down its decision in Hardwick.49
The Hardwick decision has been criticized by commentators on
many grounds. One major criticism is that the decision went beyond
the issue before the Court. The only issue before the Court was what
level of scrutiny should be applied to privacy claims regarding inti-
mate sexual conduct between same-sex couples. The Court rejected
the heightened scrutiny standard and determined that rational basis
review was all that was required.35 0 Rather than remand to the lower
court to determine the rationality of the statute, the Court, without
the benefit of any factual determinations, and without the benefit of
full briefing on the issue,35 1 determined that the statute was
347 The Virginia sodomy statute that had been at issue in the 1976 Supreme Court
affirmance of Doe prohibited both homosexual and heterosexual sexual conduct. See Va. Code
Ann. § 18.1-212 (1950) (as amended by 1960 Va. Acts 358). The Georgia statute in Hardwick
similarly covered heterosexual and homosexual sodomy. See Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2
(Michie 1984). By contrast, the particular Texas statute at issue in Baker applied only to
"deviate sexual intercourse" between persons of the same sex. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06
(West 1974). Thus, only the Texas case squarely presented an equal protection argument that
homosexuals were treated differently from heterosexuals, a difference in treatment that the
state is required to justify under the Fourteenth Amendment.
348 By this time Professor Laurence Tribe, who had agreed to argue Hardwick before the
Supreme Court, was an active participant in the Task Force.
349 Hardwick was decided June 30, 1986 and certiorari was denied in Baker v. Wade on July
7, 1986.
350 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191-96.
351 Most of the briefs on behalf of Respondent Hardwick argued in favor of "heightened
scrutiny" on the theory that intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults is a
fundamental right. See, e.g., Amicus Brief for Respondent, by Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund et al., at 4, Hardwick (No. 85-140) (arguing that the fundamental right to
privacy includes the right of adults to choose to engage in intimate sexual relations with
persons of the same sex); Amicus Brief for Respondent, by Lesbian Rights Project et al., at 8-9,
Hardwick (No. 85-140) (arguing that the right to privacy includes the right to make personal
sexual decisions). Under this test, the State of Georgia would have to provide a compelling
state interest for the criminal statute and show that the means were narrowly tailored to
accomplish the state interest. In his third and final argument in the brief filed for Respondent
Hardwick, Professor Tribe does argue that the public morality goal relied upon by the State of
Georgia is not substantially advanced by the criminal statute. But the argument appears to be
tied to a higher justification than rational basis. And it focuses on the sorts of facts than the
State of Georgia ought to be required to prove upon remand. See Respondent's Brief at 25-29,
Hardwick (No. 85-140).
The amicus brief submitted on behalf of National Gay Rights Advocates, Bay Area Lawyers
for Individual Freedom, Los Angeles Lawyers for Human Rights, and California Lawyers for
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rational. 352  Because the case was before the Court on a motion to
dismiss, there was no record below from which the Justices could rea-
sonably infer the state's justification for the statute.353 Baker, by con-
trast, had produced a full record.354
The post mortems on Hardwick continue. Would the case have
come out differently if it had been argued by an openly gay lawyer
who could have made the Court see the threat to dignity and self-
respect posed by the Georgia statute? Was it wrong to focus so nar-
rowly on the privacy aspects of the case?355 Would things have come
Individual Rights provides the most direct attack on the legitimacy of the state interest (public
morality) and the means chosen to accomplish it (enactment of a virtually unenforceable
statute regulating private consensual activity). However, these two arguments are set forth in
the brief only after a full argument about the importance of the individual liberty interest at
stake. See Amicus Brief for Respondent by National Gay Rights Advocates et al., at 4-19,
Hardwick (No. 85-140). The brief argues that even if the individual interests are not
fundamental they are "undeniably important" and thus "entitled to a significant degree of
protecton from governmental intrusion." Id. at 6. Thus, although the brief argues that the
means (e.g., criminalization) is irrational, it does so only after asking for some degree of
heightened scrutiny, rather than attacking the Georgia statute under mere rational basis
analysis.
No brief for respondent ever argues in the alternative that even if mere rational basis review
is the appropriate test, this case must be remanded for a factual determination of rationality.
352 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196. The old presumption that statutes are constitutional
generally supports a finding of rationality. But Hardwick was decided just one year after
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which, after failing to find mental
retardation a suspect class, nonetheless struck down a zoning action against them on rational
basis grounds. Cleburne was an equal protection case, but its invigorated rational basis review
is nonetheless important.
353 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188-89; see also Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick:
Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 648, 651-52 (1987) (discussing how the
court overstepped the proper scope of its decision).
354 See Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1126-34 (summarizing the evidence put forth by opposing
parties). Noting that the state did "not produce a single witness, or any other evidence, to
support the alleged state interests of 'morality and decency, welfare and safety, and
procreation,' "and completely discounting the testimony of the one witness who testified about
the "state's supposed interest in 'public health,'" the District Court concluded that the
"evidence presented at trial did not support any of these claims. Instead, it established that the
state has no 'compelling interest' to justify § 21.06-and that, indeed, this statute is not even
'rationally related' to any 'legitimate state interest.'" Id. at 1142. In Hardwick, by contrast,
the Supreme Court, relying on bald assertions in the Attorney General's brief, found that
public morality was a rational basis for the Georgia statute. See 478 U.S. at 196.
355 A Marshall clerk at the time of the Hardwick decision praises Professor Tribe for the job
he did at oral argument and does not believe the focus on privacy was a mistake. Daniel
Richman, now a professor of law at Fordham University, says: "You can't fault Tribe for
taking what seemed to be the most likely line of attack and not trying to cater to the
idiosyncratic view of a single justice." Bull, supra note 309, at 32.
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out differently if Baker, with its full record, had reached the Court
first?
There are, of course, no answers to these questions. The only con-
sensus seems to be that Hardwick has changed the course of gay
rights litigation.3 56 In the federal courts at least, litigators now avoid
privacy arguments and corresponding claims that sexual conduct is
constitutionally protected. The conduct/status distinction, a distinc-
tion used by only some lesbian and gay parties in the post-Doe years
of litigation, has now become the driving force in shaping new consti-
tutional challenges to discrimination against gays and lesbians. Rely-
ing on the conduct/status distinction, gay men and lesbians as
plaintiffs have challenged governmental discrimination in employ-
ment and other public spheres, always careful to separate questions
about what they do in private from who they are in public.3 57
2. Litigating Around Hardwick
Hardwick was a major setback in the fight to end discrimination
against gay men and lesbians. As a result, gay rights litigators, in the
post-Hardwick era, have been forced to develop constitutional argu-
ments that circumvent the Hardwick holding. There are several pos-
sible ways to litigate around Hardwick.
The most commonly employed arguments appear to be ones in
which homosexual conduct and homosexual status are bifurcated.
Such arguments acknowledge the ultimate holding in Hardwick, that
states may criminalize certain homosexual conduct with constitu-
tional impunity. However, the argument continues, this holding is
not dispositive of another question raised in gay rights litigation: Can
states discriminate against homosexuals as a class in matters unre-
lated to homosexual sexual conduct?5 8
This latter question is raised most often as an equal protection
claim.359 If homosexuals, as a class, are treated differently from other
356 See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 531, 543-53
(discussing how Hardwick will affect lesbian and gay rights claims).
357 See especially the military cases on conduct versus status discussed infra text
accompanying notes 377-92.
358 For example, can a state refuse to admit a homosexual student to its educational
facilities?
359 By contrast, the constitutional argument pressed in Hardwick relied on privacy and due
process arguments.
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classes of persons, then the state must justify the differential treatment
in the same way the state must justify classifications based on race and
sex."e° If there is no sufficient justification, then the differential treat-
ment must cease. Focusing on status, as distinct from conduct, liti-
gators have argued that discrimination against lesbians and gay men
should be subjected to the same strict liability scrutiny accorded racial
discrimination.
The initial judicial response to this argument was, on balance, nega-
tive. Most judges responded to the equal protection claims of gay and
lesbian litigants by saying that until Hardwick is reversed, no such
claim can be recognized. 361 This response was based on the same sort
of conflation of homosexual conduct and status that we saw in earlier
stages of gay rights litigation.362 The reasoning, constructed loosely
as a syllogism, is as follows:
1. Hardwick held there was no constitutional protection for
homosexual conduct.363
2. The category "homosexual" is defined as those who engage in
homosexual conduct. (Status is Conduct.)
3. Therefore, there is no protection for persons who fall within
the category.3
360 The strength of the required justification will, of course, depend on the level of scrutiny
applied to classifications based on sexual orientation. Although gay rights litigants are pushing
for heightened scrutiny, most courts are unwilling to apply anything stronger than rational
basis review. See infra note 368.
361 "After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals
is constitutionally infirm." Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 Fed.Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990). Usually the equal protection claim raises the issue of what
level of scrutiny ought to be applied. Hardwick is treated as dispositive of this issue, thereby
relegating all equal protection claims by gay men and lesbians to mere rational basis review.
See also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("It would be quite anomolous,
on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.").
362 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 115-28 (discussing gay bar cases).
363 Of course, this was not the specific holding in Hardwick. Rather, the specific holding
was that the criminal sanction survived rational basis review. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
364 If this syllogism is limited to the primary holding in Hardwick, then "no protection"
means that discrimination against such persons is subject to no more than rational basis
review. Rational basis review poses a slightly different question when the issue is whether the
state can fire a homosexual employee rather than whether the state can criminalize the
employee's off-duty sexual conduct. According to at least one pre-Hardwick decision, the
legitimate state interest in the former case will normally be somewhat stronger. See Childers,
513 F. Supp. at 146-47.
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There are three primary litigation strategies that can be pursued in
response to this reasoning. First, litigators can argue that lesbians
and gay men are entitled to heightened scrutiny when the claim is a
denial of equal protection despite the fact that Hardwick requires only
rational basis review for their substantive due process claims. We
might call this the "birfurcation of due process and equal protection"
strategy. Second, litigators can argue that status is not conduct,
thereby calling into question step two of the above syllogism. In cases
in which there is no evidence of sexual conduct, this strategy allows
litigators to to argue that self-identified lesbians and gay men (or
those percieved to be so) are protected from discriminatory state deni-
als of employment, housing, education, or other public benefits. We
might call this the "bifurcation of status and conduct" strategy.
The third alternative, and the one that I prefer, is a nonbifurcation
strategy. Under this alternative, litigators would combine substantive
due process claims that focus on conduct with equal protection claims
that focus on status. In this Part I will explain my reasons for prefer-
ring nonbifurcation. But first I will provide some elaboration on how
these three strategies avoid Hardwick and some assessment of the cur-
rent success of each strategy.
a. Strategy One: Bifurcation of Due Process and Equal Protection
Some judges have found violations of equal protection despite the
negative due process ruling in Hardwick.36 In addition, several com-
mentators have argued in favor of equal protection claims for homo-
sexuals.3 6 6 Professor Cass Sunstein, in particular, has argued that the
365 See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring the Army
to offer a rational basis for a regulation discharging officer for her acknowledged status as a
homosexual), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992); see also Watkins v. United States Army, 875
F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J., concurring) (asserting that plaintiff "is
entitled to relief because the Army denied him equal protection of the laws by discharging and
refusing to reenlist him solely on the basis of his homosexuality"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957
(1990); BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (holding that
exclusion of service member for homosexual status alone "is not rationally related to any
articulated legitimate government interest"), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
366 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915 (1989); Cass Sunstein, Sexual
Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161 (1988); Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 773 (1988).
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due process and equal protection clauses have essentially different
functions. The due process clause has been used historically to pro-
tect traditional substantive rights from the short-term intrusion of
elective majorities. The equal protection clause, by contrast, has been
used to protect those whom history has forced to exist primarily
outside of tradition, groups traditionally discriminated against, such
as racial minorities.367 Thus, it should not be surprising that due pro-
cess fails to protect nontraditional conduct while equal protection
requires a heightened justification for state discrimination against
those who engage in such conduct.
Despite the plausibility of Professor Sunstein's argument, most
post-Hardwick courts have been unwilling to grant heightened scru-
tiny to the equal protection claims of gay men and lesbians.368 There
have been some moments of hope, but all have turned out to be short-
lived.369 At the current time, the greatest hope for equal protection in
furthering gay and lesbian rights is that a court, in applying rational
basis review, will require the state to offer proof that the discrimina-
tory rule is indeed rational. Although this approach does not consti-
tute heightened scrutiny of the sort accorded race and gender
discrimination claims, the level of review is somewhat greater than
traditional rational basis review. One might call this "rational basis
with a bite. '370
Pruitt v. Cheney37 was the first case to raise the possibility of suc-
cess for gay rights litigators under "rational basis with a bite" review.
The case was before the court on a motion to dismiss. In Pruitt, The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to apply heightened
scrutiny to the Army's ban on homosexuals. 372 The court remanded
for further consideration of the plaintiff's equal protection claim,
367 Sunstein, supra note 366, at 1174 & nn.66-67.
368 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.
1990); BenShalom, 881 F.2d at 464-65; Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Todd v. Navarro, 698 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
369 See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying strict
scrutiny to Army's ban on enlistment of homosexual soldiers), vacated and aff'd on other
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Jantz v.
Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550-51 (D. Kan. 1991) (applying strict scrutiny), rev'd, 976 F.2d
623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993).
370 Or, in the alternative, "active" rational basis review. See Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp.
298, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
371 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
372 Id. at 1165.
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however, holding that discriminatory policies that simply give effect
to society's prejudices do not suffice under the rational basis test.373
Thus, the Army must present evidence of the rationality of its
policies.374
A subsequent case, Meinhold v. Department of Defense,37- has
applied the Pruitt rational basis test and found the Navy's ban on
homosexual sailors unconstitutional under equal protection analysis.
Citing Pruitt, the Meinhold court said:
To survive Meinhold's claim that the Department of Defense's pol-
icy banning gays and lesbians based merely on status, and not con-
duct, violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the Department of Defense must establish, through a factual record,
that its policy is rationally related to its permissible goals .... In
determining whether the policy is rationally related, the Court cannot
merely defer to the "military judgment" as the rationale for the pol-
icy-the Court must consider the factual basis underlying the "mili-
tary judgment. 376
b. Strategy Two: Bifurcation of Status and Conduct
As the Meinhold case suggests, evidence that the discrimination
occurs on the basis of status and not conduct may be a prerequisite to
maintaining a successful equal protection challenge.377 For this rea-
son, litigators have, whenever possible, distanced themselves from
Hardwick by claiming that their clients have been the victims of dis-
373 Id. at 1165-66.
374 Id. at 1166-67; see also Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 308-09 (refusing to dismiss plaintiff's
equal protection claim). Buttino was before the court on motions for summary judgment.
Citing Pruitt, the court held that a full trial was necessary because factual questions had been
raised about the rationality of the FBI's discriminatory policy. "Among the court's questions
as to the rationality of the policy is how, for example, the FBI can rationally implement a
policy which (as defendants themselves describe it) requires gay employees to be
simultaneously 'open' and 'discreet' as to their homosexual conduct." Id. at 308.
375 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
376 Id. at 1457 (citation omitted).
377 But consider the fact that at least one court has found that the Hardwick Court's refusal
to grant substantive protection for homosexual conduct prevents the recognition of
homosexuals as a class at all, even for purposes of rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. See Doe v. Sparks, 733 F. Supp. 227, 231 (W.D. Pa. 1990) ("It seems to us
contradictory to hold that a class which is not entitled to any substantive protection under the
due process clause is nevertheless entitled to status under the federal constitution as a class for
equal protection purposes.").
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crimination based on "status" and by arguing that "conduct" should
not be presumed from status.
The military cases provide an interesting vehicle for testing the lim-
its of the due process/equal protection dichotomy. Because the mili-
tary policy bans homosexuals from serving on the basis of their status
alone, gay rights litigators have been able to capitalize on the status/
conduct distinction. Joseph Steffan was kicked out of the naval acad-
emy for nothing more than a verbal admission to his commanding
officer that he was gay.178 Miriam BenShalom was barred from re-
enlistment in the Army Reserves solely because she admitted she was
a lesbian.3 79 Dusty Pruitt was relieved of her position in the Army
Reserve after her commanding officer read a story in the Los Angeles
Times in which Pruitt had spoken about what it meant to be a lesbian
and a minister in the Metropolitan Community Church.3 10  And
Keith Meinhold "was discharged from the Navy and deprived of his
career after he announced on an ABC television news program that
he was gay. Meinhold was discharged not because he engaged in pro-
hibited conduct, but because he labeled himself as gay. ' 3 1 The only
conduct at issue in any of these cases was "speech." However, none
of these persons was terminated for the speech itself, but rather for
the knowledge conveyed by the speech: that each considered himself
or herself to be homosexual.
In July 1993, President Bill Clinton announced a new policy
regarding lesbians and gay men in the military, generally known as
the "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue" policy.382 This policy was
planned to go into effect on October 1, 1993,383 and does not appear to
affect any of the cases now in litigation. The only obvious change
from recent policy is that applicants for military service will no longer
be asked about their sexual orientation at time of enlistment. 38 4
378 Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
379 BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1373 (E.D.Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
380 Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1161.
381 Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. at 1456.
382 John Lancaster & Ann Devroy, Clinton Plan Bars Most Gay Conduct, Wash. Post, July
17, 1993, at Al.
383 Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Policy
on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, July 19, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Aspin
Memorandum].
384 Id. at 1.
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The new policy is couched in terms of the status/conduct dichot-
omy.385 Yet it pushes the dichotomy further than any court has yet
done by defining conduct to include any "statement that the [service]
member is homosexual or bisexual. ' a8 6 All of the "status" military
cases now in litigation axe cases in which the member has made a
statement acknowledging her or his sexual orientation.38 7 In cases
385 There is a four page document attached to the Aspin Memorandum entitled "Policy
Guidelines on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces" [hereinafter Policy Guidelines]. It
states: "Sexual orientation will not be a bar to service unless manifested by homosexual
conduct. The military will discharge members who engage in homosexual conduct." Id. at 1.
386 Id. The Aspin Memorandum, read in conjunction with the Policy Guidelines, creates
some confusion. Whereas the latter defines homosexual conduct to include "a statement that
the member is homosexual or bisexual," the former refers to "a statement by the
servicemember that demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts." Aspin
Memorandum at 2. The memorandum then goes on to provide that "[a] statement by a
servicemember that he or she is homosexual or bisexual creates a rebuttable presumption that
the servicemember is engaging in homosexual acts or has a propensity or intent to do so." Id.
Although the member "has the opportunity to present evidence" to rebut the presumption, id.,
it is not clear who bears the ultimate burden of proof on this issue.
This "rebuttable presumption" approach is not new. The government made a similar
argument in Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990), when the plaintiff refused to
answer questions about conduct. Steffan claimed he had been dismissed solely for making the
statement that he was gay and the government claimed that the statement raised a
presumption as to conduct, thereby making questions about conduct relevant to the proceding.
The Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument, raised only on appeal, finding no
support for it in the record. Id. at 76 n.4. Steffan thus remains a "pure status" case.
The new policy's definition of "homosexual conduct" includes "a homosexual act" or a
"marriage or attempted marriage to someone of the same gender." Policy Guidelines at 1. A
homosexual act is defined to include "any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires or any
bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts." Aspin Memorandum at 2. Mere handholding may be
viewed as a homosexual act. See Policy Guidelines at 1. Thus, status again appears
tantamount to conduct under the new policy, unless the servicemember keeps his or her
homosexuality entirely secret.
387 By "status" cases, I mean those in which there is no evidence of conduct other than the
declaration by the plaintiff identifying as lesbian or gay. Because under the old military policy
(in effect until October 1, 1993), sexual orientation was sufficient for a servicemember's
removal, these cases are being litigated on the basis of "status" alone. Such cases include
Pruitt, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992); Steffan v. Cheney,
780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), appeal docketed sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, No. 91-5409 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 27, 1991); Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. 1455; Cammermeyer v. Cheney, No. C92-942-Z
(W.D. Wash. filed June 11, 1992) (stayed pending President Clinton's announcement of the
change in policy). See Lambda Update (Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New
York, N.Y.), Summer 1993, at 15.
BenShalom was also a "status" case, but litigation of that case has ended. See BenShalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding the Army's refusal to allow plaintiff to
reenlist), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
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such as Steffan v. Cheney,3 8 the revelation was in honest response to
a question from an investigating officer, 3 9 a question which appar-
ently would be barred under the new policy. Nonetheless, the new
policy contains no provision that could be applied retroactively to
support Steffan's claim that he was wrongly removed from the Naval
Academy.39 0
Thus, the "status" military cases now in litigation will continue to
bifurcate status and conduct. Few other cases provide the opportu-
nity for such a complete bifurcation because there are few other gov-
ernmental entities with an express policy against gay men and lesbians
as a class. 39 1 Any one of these cases could end up before the Supreme
Court, 392 at which point the Court would have the opportunity to
clarify how Hardwick affects equal protection claims and to resolve
the conduct/status dilemma.
Looking beyond the current military cases, litigators should not
consider it necessary to bifurcate status from all conduct in order to
avoid Hardwick. The conduct at issue in Hardwick was homosexual
sodomy, as defined by the Georgia legislature. Thus a limited bifurca-
tion-sodomy versus all other conduct-should suffice.393 To date,
however, no litigated case has employed this limited bifurcation the-
388 780 F. Supp. 1.
389 Id. at 3.
390 Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and the ACLU have filed suit on behalf of
seven individual plaintiffs challenging the new policy and asking for declaratory and injunctive
relief. See Doe v. Aspin, No. 93-1549 (D.D.C. filed July 7, 1993).
391 For example, the FBI reports that its "focus in personnel matters has been and continues
to be on conduct rather than status or preference." Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 98 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (quoting a letter written by an FBI official).
392 Although the Court has recently denied certiorari in two military cases, both of those
cases had upheld the military's decision to terminate the lesbian or gay servicemember. See
BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990);
Woodward v. United Sates, 871 F. 2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003
(1990). The Court also denied certiorari in Pruitt, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992), a case in which the
ruling below was not favorable to the military. See Pruitt, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991)
(remanding to district court for application of the rational basis test, with instructions that the
military has the burden of proving that its policy is rational). However, Pruitt was before the
court on a motion to dismiss and thus can be appealed to the Supreme Court again once a
decision on the merits has been made.
Appellate courts in Steffan, Meinhold, Pruitt, and Cammermeyer could conceivably rule
against the military, in which case the Supreme Court might be more likely to grant a petition
for certiorari.
393 This limited bifurcation theory is discussed further infra notes 427-41 and
accompanying text.
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ory with success.394 Instead, judges refuse to recognize lesbian and
gay equal protection claims, citing Hardwick, and apparently assum-
ing that all lesbians and gay men (or at least the plaintiffs in the case
before the court) engage in homosexual sodomy. This assumption
underlies the claim made by some judges that the class (i.e., homosex-
uals) is defined by the conduct (i.e., sodomy).
How the class is defined depends on who is doing the defining. If
concepts of individual identity or definitions created by the lesbian
and gay community are to play any role in defining the class, then
there is no basis in fact for assuming that all lesbians and gay men
engage in sodomy. Self-identified homosexuals surely have an identity
apart from their sexual conduct. It is not uncommon for persons to
identify themselves as gay or lesbian before they have engaged in any
sexual conduct.3 95 Recognition of intense emotional attachments to
persons of the same sex may be a sufficient indicator of sexual iden-
tity. A woman who chooses another woman as her life partner may
attribute her lesbian identity to aspects of her relationship and events
in her life apart from actual sexual conduct.3 96 Thus the reality for
many gay men and lesbians is that sexual identity (status) is some-
thing much broader than sexual conduct, and in some cases (e.g., celi-
bacy) may even exclude sexual conduct.397
394 The theory was successful in the district court in High Tech Gays, discussed infra at
notes 433-41 and accompanying text, but was not not adopted by the appellate court. See
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
395 See Carol Anne Beynon Warren, Identity and Community in the Gay World (1972).
Warren concludes on the basis of her "participant observation" that:
Community-imputed identity as homosexual may or may not involve the commission of
homosexual acts-clearly recognized within the community is the conception of a
homosexual who has never engaged in genital sexual behavior with a member of his
own sex. Secondly, the imputation of homosexuality includes, most importantly, the
conscious expression of sexual and romantic feelings towards members of one's own sex,
whether or not this is articulated into action.
Id. at 212; see also Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, in Forms of Desire, supra note
182, at 24 ("Some [people] recognize that homosexual feelings and behavior are not confined to
the persons they would like to call 'homosexuals' and some of these persons do not actually
engage in homosexual behavior.").
396 As Marc Fajer explains: "My self-identity as a gay man is as much tied up with my
wanting another man with whom to buy a car, attend dinner parties, and redecorate the house
as it is with sexual fantasies and acts." Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay
Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511, 640 (1992).
397 See Halley, supra note 365, at 949.
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An important question for constitutional equal protection theory is
whether the category "homosexual" is one that ought to be defined by
members of the class, in which case sodomy is not likely to be the
determining factor, or whether the category is one that ought to be
defined externally by judges or others, in which case the presumption
of sodomy may well be determinitive.a98 Social scientists point out
that society began labeling persons as homosexual in order to classify
them as deviants and to punish and deter homosexual behavior.3 99
Today many people continue to discriminate against lesbians and gays
in part because they presume that gay men and lesbians engage in
immoral or criminal sexual acts.4°° For these persons, status is
defined by presumed conduct. Given the history of the construction
of homosexuality, it should not be surprising that many judges think
"sodomite" every time a gay man or lesbian proudly self-identifies as
gay or lesbian.
Litigators might counter this presumption by arguing that it is
incorrect. In particular, public interest litigators could use the pre-
sumption to educate the judiciary regarding the realities of gay and
lesbian lives. Witnesses might be called upon to demonstrate the
minor role that specific sexual conduct plays in the self-identification
of many lesbians and gay men. Although I realize that such a tactic
exposes witnesses to the risks of detailed cross-examination regarding
their sexual activity, I am less concerned about these risks than
others.401 In cases in which the presumption of sodomy is likely to
control disposition of the case, there seems to be little risk of real loss
and some chance of gain.
Litigators might also want to undercut the sodomy presumption by
arguing that the step from valid criminalization of actual conduct
398 An extended treatment of this question is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
excellent discussion of the problems that can arise when a group attempts to use society's
negative definition of its members in order to gain positive legal rights for the group, see
Epstein, supra note 182, at 251-58.
399 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 14, at 2-3; McIntosh, supra note 395, at 27-28.
4W Discrimination may also be based on strong feelings about gender roles. Thus, gay men
may be discriminated against because they are viewed as rejecting traditional masculinity. See
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wisc. L. Rev. 187
(1988).
401 See, e.g, Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on
the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1643, 1688-89
(commenting on this Article).
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(Hardwick) to valid discrimination on the basis of presumed conduct
is a big one. A number of pre-Hardwick cases can be cited for the
proposition that conduct should not be presumed from the mere fact
of status.4°2 Relying on these cases, post-Hardwick equal protection
challenges could ask courts to confine their analysis regarding con-
duct to proven rather than presumed conduct.4' a
To date, the status/conduct distinction has met with minimal suc-
cess in the courts. This lack of success may be explained in part by
the fact that in most cases it is virtually impossible to make a claim
that the discrimination ocurred solely because of the plaintiff's status.
Those military cases identified earlier in this Part as "status cases"
may be an exception,' especially those in which status was privately
communicated. But the dismissals of Dusty Pruitt and Keith
Meinhold, whose cases have thus far met with favorable judicial rul-
ings, could be recast as dismissals on grounds of conduct, i.e., the
public announcement of their sexual orientation. Indeed, if homosex-
ual status is accorded constitutional protection by the courts, there is
every reason to believe that government actors will become more
intent on justifying their discriminatory actions in terms of conduct
rather than status. We are seeing such a move now as the new mili-
tary policy broadly defines prohibited conduct to include acts of self-
identification.
c. Strategy Three: Nonbifurcation
I do not believe that either of the two bifurcation strategies
described above are useful long-range strategies. They have been
402 See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text (discussing Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d
969 (Cal. 1951)); supra notes 317-32 and accompanying text (discussing gay student
organization cases).
403 This has been the approach in several post-Hardwick military cases. In Steffan, for
example, the plaintiff refused to answer questions regarding conduct even though the district
court ordered him to do so. Despite the court's finding that "the record is clear that plaintiff
was separated from the Naval Academy based on his admissions that he is a homosexual
rather than on any evidence of homosexual misconduct," the court at first dismissed the case
when plaintiff refused to answer questions about conduct. Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 121,
124 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The district court, on the merits,
subsequently upheld the Navy's decision despite the absence of any evidence regarding
conduct. See Steffan, 780 F. Supp. 1, which is currrently scheduled for oral argument on
appeal to the D.C. Circuit; see also Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. at 1458 ("Gays and lesbians should
not be banned from serving our country in the absence of conduct which interferes with the
military mission.").
404 See supra note 387.
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developed in response to Hardwick, a case that gay rights litigators
would like to see reversed. Litigation strategeies for the advancement
of lesbian and gay rights should be planned with an eye to the even-
tual reversal of Hardwick. Bifurcating equal protection from due pro-
cess, and status from conduct, does not sufficiently challenge the
Hardwick holding. Thus, litigators should adopt strategies that
emphasize our individual rights to engage in loving conduct, includ-
ing sexual conduct, while simultaneously challenging class-based dis-
crimination. Put another way, I would like to see litigators blend
substantive due process claims with equal protection claims.
Bifurcation strategies are not necessary to litigate around Hard-
wick. Rather, by taking the position that Hardwick should be strictly
limited to its facts and specific holding, litigators should be free to
debate, and courts should be free to rule on, the numerous issue that
Hardwick did not decide.
First of all, although the Court did decide that discrimination
against gays and lesbians in the form of state criminalization of their
sexual activity is rational,4" 5 the case did not address any other form
of discrimination against gays and lesbians. In other words, Hard-
wick did not decide that discrimination against gay men and lesbians
is rational in every case. In future litigation challenging other forms
of state-enforced discrimination, a nonbifurcation strategy would con-
tend that Hardwick's rational basis test ought to require, at the very
least, some analysis of the governmental action at issue.4"6
405 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196. Although the Georgia statute involved in Hardwick
criminalized both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, see Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (Michie
1984), heterosexual sodomy was not before the Court because the heterosexual plaintiffs were
dismissed below on standing grounds. See Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1206-07. The Court's
analysis suggests that it might decide a heterosexual sodomy case differently. The Court relied
heavily on its perception that homosexuals had been viewed as outcasts by dominant traditions
and stressed that homosexuality had nothing to do with marriage and procreation. Id. at 190-
92. Heterosexual sodomy, by contrast, is an activity engaged in by husbands and wives and is
a sexual activity that can be be classified as a form of birth control. (Of course, homosexual
sodomy is also a form of birth control, but given the absence of the risk of pregnancy during
same-sex lovemaking, the Court would likely dismiss a privacy claim couched in birth control
rhetoric as frivolous.)
406 The court in Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) recognizes this point, at
least in part, when it says:
That [i.e., applying Hardwick to deny suspect classification for equal protection claims]
does not mean, however, that any kind of negative state action against homosexuals
would be constitutionally authorized. Laws or government practices must still, if
challenged, pass the rational basis test of the equal protection clause. A governmental
1628 [Vol. 79:1551
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  1628 1993
Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights
In Hardwick, the state action was criminalization of certain con-
duct, and five of the justices determined that the statute at issue was a
rational means to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, the
protection of public morality. In challenging other forms of state-
enforced discrimination, such as employment discrimination based on
either homosexual status or conduct, litigators should ask judges to
examine carefully both the state's end and means before determining
that the discrimination is rational. It should not suffice in either a
status or conduct case for the court to assume summarily that the
discrimination is justified solely on the authority of Hardwick. At the
very least, the court must ask whether denying jobs to homosexuals is
a rational means to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose.
For example, assume that the government were to assert in a job
discrimination case the same purpose asserted in Hardwick, the pro-
tection of public morality. To support its position, the government
would then have to argue that denying jobs to homosexuals is a
rational way to protect public morality. It could not rely on Hard-
wick for that proposition because Hardwick was about the criminal-
ization of specifically proven conduct and not about the denial of jobs
to persons who may or may not have engaged in that conduct. Fur-
thermore, in states that have chosen to decriminalize same-sex sod-
omy, one might argue that state employment against lesbians and gay
men can hardly be justified on grounds of public morality since the
state has apparently changed its mind about the immoral nature of
the conduct or at least about the rationality of penalizing it.
Litigators who wish to claim heightened scrutiny for their clients
should not abandon arguments about the irrationality of discrimina-
tory treatment. Consider, for example, the strategy of the plaintiff's
lawyers in Padula v. Webster," 7 an equal protection challenge to FBI
discrimination against a lesbian applicant. Padula's claim for height-
ened scrutiny was rejected by the court, and her attorneys failed to
make any sort of back-up argument related to low-level rational basis
agency that discriminates against homosexuals must justify that discrimination in terms
of some government purpose.
Id. at 103-04.
Whereas the Padula court mentions only governmental purpose, rational basis analysis
ought to require some consideration of the means chosen to accomplish the purpose.
407 822 F.2d 97.
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review.408 The court was then free to decide for the defendant, con-
structing its own rational basis justification for the decision. The
court concluded that the FBI's decision not to hire a "practicing
homosexual" was rationally related to protecting the FBI's integrity
because homosexuals are subject to blackmail.4 9 There was no fac-
tual basis in the record to support this conclusion in Padula. To the
contrary, given the individual applicant's testimony about her open-
ness and comfort with her sexual identity, it is hard to imagine how
the risk of blackmail would have arisen. To support its position, the
court merely cited Dronenburg v. Zech.41 0 I am suggesting that
rational basis analysis ought to require more than mere conjecture
and that lesbian and gay rights litigators ought to engage in rational
basis review arguments to combat this sort of judicial stereotyping of
gay people.
Litigators in post-Hardwick employment discrimination cases may
find it useful to draw upon earlier civil service discrimination cases in
constructing argumants that discrimination on the basis of homosex-
ual status or conduct is irrational. These "nexus" test cases, such as
Norton v. Macy,"' required some showing that the immoral or illegal
off-duty conduct of a civil service employee was relevant to job per-
formance.412  Post-Hardwick litigators ought to be able to borrow
from these "nexus test" cases. If there is no evidence of sexual con-
duct, presumed sexual conduct should not be sufficient to warrant job
termination.1 3 Even if the employee is arrested on sodomy charges,
408 Id. at 104.
4o Id. at 99, 104.
410 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (a case involving anti-gay discrimination against a Navy
petty officer who had, not surprisingly, attempted to hide his homosexuality from the Navy). If
homosexuality is a ground for discharge, then it would naturally be difficult for naval officers
to be open. Thus, the Navy's own treatment of homosexuality creates the potential for
blackmail. Nonetheless, reports commissioned by the military itself conclude that gay and
lesbian servicemembers pose no greater security risk than non-gay servicemembers. See Kate
Dyer, Gays in Uniform: The Pentagon's Secret Reports xvi (1990) (concluding that gay men
and lesbians pose no special security risk). But see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 575 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that despite positive evidence that
homosexuals are good security risks, the Department of Defense could rationally believe
otherwise because the KGB tended to target homosexuals).
411 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
412 Id. at 1167-68.
413 Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), which codified the Macy test, an employee cannot be
dismissed unless there is evidence of misconduct. See 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (1988).
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some connection between the off-duty conduct and the job ought to be
required.41 4 As with the "nexus test," if the off-duty conduct is par-
ticularly notorious and egregious so that public confidence in the
employee is likely to be affected, then the rational basis test would be
met.41 5
Second, litigation strategies should stress that Hardwick did not
deny all substantive due process rights to gay men and lesbians.
Thus, it is not necessary to abandon substantive due process claims
and rely solely on equal protection claims to avoid Hardwick. At its
narrowest, Hardwick held that there is no fundamental constitutional
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, even when the act occurs in
the privacy of an individual's bedroom.4 16 The case decides nothing
about constitutional protection for other forms of conduct. Hardwick
thus leaves litigators free to make substantive due process claims
regarding other forms of conduct, both sexual and nonsexual.
Justice White's opinion in Hardwick supports a narrow reading.
He expressly limited the holding to the specific conduct in the case
before the Court, i.e., homosexual sodomy.417 At the same time, how-
ever, he warned that we should not read earlier precedent as establish-
ing constitutional protection for "any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults. ' 418 Hardwick thus permits criminaliza-
tion of homosexual sodomy. Other sexual conduct cases have yet to
be decided.
The Hardwick majority reasoned that states could criminalize
homosexual sodomy because such conduct was not part of a long-
recognized tradition in American history. Indeed, according to Jus-
tice White, "[p]roseriptions against that conduct have ancient
roots. '41 9 However, these age-old proscriptions do not necessarily
414 See, e.g., Bonet v. United States Postal Service, 661 F.2d 1071, 1073-74 (5th Cir. 1981)
(requiring proof that employee who committed indecency with a child was thereby unfit to be
postal employee).
415 Some courts are willing to presume "nexus" in such cases, although this presumption is
used sparingly. See Neal Miller, Criminal Convictions, "Off-Duty Misconduct," and Federal
Employment: The Need for Better Definition of the Basis for Disciplinary Action, 39 Am.
Univ. L. Rev. 869, 875-88 (1990) (discussing presumption).
416 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191, 195-96.
417 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2 ("We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy.").
418 Id. at 191.
419 Id. at 192.
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apply to all forms of lesbian and gay sex. History, to the extent it
provides evidence of these ancient proscriptions, tells us that English
common law prohibited the "infamous crime against nature, commit-
ted either with man or beast."420 Under English law "the infamous
crime" was thought to be that of "buggery" or "sodomy." Both
terms historically referred to anal intercourse, whether committed
with another man, a woman, or a beast.4 21 More ancient proscrip-
tions are contained in biblical passages. The district court opinion in
Doe, for example, relied on the following passage from Leviticus:
"Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomina-
tion." 422 This language suggests a prohibition on anal intercourse
between men.
Recent, rather than ancient, proscriptions extended criminal sanc-
tions to oral-genital sexual conduct, the act for which Michael Hard-
wick was arrested.423 Consensual lesbian sex was never criminally
proscribed in Britain.424 Moreover, consensual lesbian sex was not an
offense under the Georgia law until 1968.425 Indeed, some sex histori-
ans have produced historical evidence that lesbian relationships were
420 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 215-16 (photo. reprint
1979) (1769).
421 See generally Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L.J. 1073,
1082-83 nn.62-63 (1988) (discussing the historical meanings of the terms); see also Gr. Brit.
Comm. on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, The Wolfenden Report 55-58 (Stein and
Day 1963) (1957) [hereinafter Wolfenden Report] (explaining that buggery, meaning anal
intercourse with another person or any type of intercourse with animals, was the term used in
England and Wales, whereas sodomy, meaning anal intercourse with another person, was the
term used in Scotland).
422 Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202 n.2 (citing Leviticus 18:22).
423 Oral-genital conduct was criminalized in Britain in 1855, in a statute that prohibited acts
of gross indecency bewteen males. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., ch. 6,
§ 11 (Eng.). Criminalization of oral-genital conduct occurred somewhat later in the United
States. See Goldstein, supra note 421, at 1086 n.74. The Wolfenden Report, supra note 421, at
57-58, reveals that in Britain anal intercourse (buggery and sodomy) was punished more
severely than other forms of homosexual conduct.
424 Nonconsensual female-female sex, known as "indecent assault on a female by a female,"
was subject to criminal penalty by statute in England and Wales and by common law in
Scotland. See Wolfenden Report, supra note 421, at 55-57. But see Ruthann Robson,
Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 Wis. Women's LJ. 1, 7-13 (1990) (claiming
that lesbian sex was criminalized during a 15 year period in Canada and suggesting that the
British law might have been more complicated on this question than most scholars suppose).
425 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200-01 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the earlier
Georgia sodomy statute). In Thompson v. Aldredge, 200 S.E. 799, 800 (Ga. 1939), the
Georgia Supreme Court held that the earlier statute did not prohibit lesbian activity.
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thought to be positive so long as the women moved from them into
heterosexual marriage.426 And the British and Biblical proscriptions
against male-male sex, described above, do not specifically cover such
acts as mutual masturbation.
One possibility for chipping away at Hardwick would be to pursue
other sexual conduct cases in which the specific sexual conduct can be
distinguished from that in Hardwick.4 27 State v. Walsh,428 a post-
Hardwick case in Missouri, provided just such an opportunity. The
Missouri statute at issue criminalized any sexual contact (or
attempted sexual contact) involving the hand of one person and the
sexual organ of another.429 Although the majority decision willingly
and readily applied Hardwick to uphold the conviction of a man
whose hand touched the penis of another fully-clothed man,430 Judge
Blackmar's dissent makes a compelling point:
I am... inclined to believe that [the Missouri statute] goes beyond
the limits of state power in defining "deviate sexual intercourse" as
involving the hand. This is not the offense of sodomy as discussed in
[Bowers. v. Hardwick] and it has no long history of legal sanction
such as seemed very important to Justice White in that case. Bowers
recognizes a right of privacy under the Constitution of the United
States, but holds that this right of privacy does not extend to offenses
traditionally punished as sodomy. Its rationale is absent here.431
Another possibility for chipping away at Hardwick is to make sub-
stantive due process arguments, in conjunction with equal protection
arguments, in lesbian and gay discrimination cases. The substantive
due process claim can focus on the fundamental importance of lesbian
and gay conduct, whereas the equal protection claim can attack the
irrationality of the discriminatory classification. Again, a limited
bifurcation strategy can be employed because Hardwick made a nega-
tive determination only as to the fundamental importance of criminal
homosexual sodomy; the constitutional importance of other homosex-
ual conduct remains open for debate in the lower courts. When sexual
426 See, e.g., Lillian Faderman, Surpassing the Love of Men 75 (1981) (discussing the role of
female romantic friendships in England during the late 18th century).
427 See the discussion supra text accompanying notes 393-94 regarding limited bifurcation,
i.e., bifurcating sodomy from other conduct.
428 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
429 Id. at 509.
430 Id. at 509, 511.
431 Id. at 514 (Mo. 1986) (Blackmar, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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conduct is at issue, gay rights litigators need to be explicit about what
the conduct is. And if the conduct falls short of sodomy, we need to
make that fact clear and distinguish Hardwick accordingly. Directly
addressing issues of conduct under substantive due process would
allow gay litigants to emphasize the positive aspects of their emotional
and affectional lives.
Instead, most post-Hardwick gay rights litigants have elected to
structure their cases primarily as equal protection cases, presumably
to distance themselves from Hardwick and to argue for suspect or
quasi-suspect classification. In some instances, cases that began pre-
Hardwick included both substantive due process and equal protection
claims, but dropped the substantive due process claims after the nega-
tive decision in Hardwick. Padula is one such case.432 The litigants
in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industry Security Clearance Office,433 by
contrast, continued to argue for heightened judicial scrutiny under
both equal protection and substantive due process.
Homosexual sodomy was not directly at issue in either Padula or
High Tech Gays, but there was evidence of other homosexual conduct.
The FBI's background check on Padula turned up evidence that she
was a "practicing homosexual, '434 although it did not explain what
she practiced. Padula, when questioned, affirmed her sexual orienta-
tion and explained "that although she does not flaunt her sexual ori-
entation, she is unembarrassed and open about it and it is a fact well
known to her family, friends and co-workers. 43 5 The plaintiffs in
High Tech Gays, civilian employees in the defense industry, were sub-
jected to background checks by the Department of Defense, solely
because of their homosexuality.436 Security clearances were denied
various plaintiffs on the basis of information uncovered. In particu-
lar, one employee alleged that he was denied a clearance on the basis
of his own admissions that: "(a)... he visits Gay bathhouses; (b)...
he belongs to a Gay organization; (c)... he has homosexual activity
with casual acquaintances; (d) he intend[ed] to inform his employer of
432 "We do not address Padula's initial assertion that her constitutional rights to privacy
and due process were violated since she does not argue this on appeal." Padula, 822 F.2d at 99
n.1.
433 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1367-68 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
434 Padula, 822 F.2d at 99.
435 Id.
436 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565.
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his homosexuality; and (e) he intend[ed] to continue his homosexual
lifestyle in the future. '437
District Judge Thelton Henderson ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in
High Tech Gays, responding to their substantive due process claim4 38
as follows:
The Supreme Court in Hardwick simply did not address the issue
of all homosexual activity.... Hardwick does not hold, for example,
that two gay people have no right to touch each other in a way that
expresses their affection and love for each other. Nor does Hardwick
address such issues as whether lesbians and gay men have a funda-
mental right to engage in homosexual activity such as kissing, holding
hands, caressing, or any number of other sexual acts that do not con-
stitute sodomy under the Georgia statute.439
Although High Tech Gays was reversed on appeal,440 Judge Hen-
derson offers the better reasoned opinion on the substantive due pro-
cess claim.441 Substantive due process arguments should continue in
gay rights litigation. Hardwick should be limited to its facts. And in
each new case, judges should be asked to rule on the fundamental
importance of love, affection, intimacy, commitment, expressions of
437 Id. at 579 (quoting Third Amended Complaint, 1 11).
438 Judge Henderson's opinion may be better remembered by gay rights litigators for its
determination that the lesbian and gay plaintiffs constituted a quasi-suspect class for equal
protection purposes. See High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1368.
439 Id. at 1370.
440 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 581 (reversing both the equal protection and substantive
due process claims under lower level rational basis review).
441 In dismissing the substantive due process claim, the court of appeals reasoned, in part, as
follows:
There has been a repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the Court has placed
on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.... If for federal
analysis we must reach equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499.... and if there is
no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, see Hardwick,... it would be incongruous to expand the reach
of equal protection to find a fundamental right of homosexual conduct under the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 571.
I cannot unravel the court's logic in this point. Because the court is focusing on liberty
interests and substantive due process, I do not understand why it is necessary to get to due
process through equal protection. Why not focus directly on the claimed liberty, i.e., the right
to engage in certain conduct? Because the court never mentions specific conduct other than
the sodomy at issue in Hardwick, I cannot tell whether the court even understands that there is
other conduct at issue. The court never addresses the point made by Judge Henderson, that
Hardwick is a ruling on sodomy and that lesbians and gay men are being punished by the
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concern, and all other forms of conduct that lesbians and gay men
embrace as part of their lesbian and gay lifestyle.
To support nonbifurcation arguments that combine due process
and equal protection claims, litigators might cite Evans v. Romer,' 2 a
favorable gay rights decision handed down by the Colorado Supreme
Court on July 19, 1993. This case was litigated as part of the ongoing
battle over anti-gay discrimination ordinances. 43 Holding that the
equal protection clause guarantees all groups equal access to the
political process, the court affirmed the issuance of a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of Colorado's recently passed
Amendment 2, which had prohibited the enactment and enforcement
of anti-gay discrimination measures. 4 " Although the court justifies
its decision under the equal protection clause, the case has an obvious
"fundamental rights" aspect. The class of lesbians and gay men is
cognizable under the equal protection clause because as a class they
are being denied a fundamental right: the right to participate equally
in the political process.44
Shahar v. Bowers" 6 is another case, currently in litigation, in which
equal protection arguments may be strengthened by the presence of
Department of Defense for other forms of conduct. For these reasons, I conclude that Judge
Henderson has the better reasoned opinion on substantive due process.
If the court means, in the above passage, to reject heightened scrutiny for equal protection
purposes under the Fifth Amendment because equal protection under that Amendment must
be derived from the concept of "due process," then the logic is understandable. But I read this
passage as a denial of the plaintiffs' due process, not equal protection, claims.
442 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). The majority opinion does not
even mention the Hardwick decision.
443 In 1992, Colorado and Oregon voters were faced with a ballots proposing amendments
to their respective state constitutions, which would have banned pro-lesbian and gay legislation
and administrative regulations. The Oregon initiative failed, but the Colorado amendment
(known as "Amendment 2") passed. Bill McAllister, Gay Rights Groups Applaud Clinton's
Win, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1992, at A30.
Similar anti-gay initiatives are being proposed by anti-gay activists in Florida, Idaho, Maine,
Washington, and again in Oregon. See John Gallagher, Bracing for Battle, The Advocate,
June 29, 1993, at 50. In response, the Oregon legislature has recently passed a statute
outlawing such initiatives. Oregon Lawmakers Ban Local Votes on Gay Bias, N.Y. Times,
July 30, 1993, at A10.
4" Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286.
445 See id. On July 20, 1993, the Governor of Colorado announced that the decision would
be appealed to the United States Supreme Court immediately. 15 Nat'l L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at
6.
446 No. 1:91-CV-2397-RCF (N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 3, 1991). As of this writing, motions for
summary judgment have been made and briefed. The parties are currently waiting for the
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recognized fundamental rights. Robin Shahar graduated at the top of
her law school class at Emory Law School where she was the Notes
and Comments Editor of the Law Review.' 7 During the summer
before her final year in law school, she clerked for the Attorney Gen-
eral of Georgia, Michael Bowers. Based on her outstanding record
and her job performance, she was offered a permanent job with the
Criminal Division of the Attorney General's Office. The summer
before she was to begin her employment, she called Bob Coleman, the
Deputy Attorney General for Administration, to touch base and to
notify him that she was changing her last name from Brown to
Shahar. She also informed Mr. Coleman that the reason for the name
change was that she and another woman had decided to be married in
a Jewish religious ceremony, and they had agreed that they would
both adopt the name "Shahar," which means "the act of seeking
God" in Hebrew.448 Shortly thereafter, Shahar received a letter from
Bowers withdrawing the offer of permanent employment because of
information received concerning "a purported marriage between
[Shahar] and another woman." 449
Attorney General Bowers (the same person who defended the
Georgia sodomy statute in the Hardwick suit), justified his action by
asserting that Shahar's employment in the criminal division would
interfere with that division's ability to enforce the laws of Georgia.
At the core of Bowers' position is his belief that same-sex marriages
are "inconsistent with the state laws prohibiting sodomy between
partners of the same sex. "450 In his own words, "the natural conse-
quence of a marriage is some sort of sexual conduct, I would think to
most people, and if it's homosexual, it would have to be sodomy. "451
Despite the presumptions made by Attorney General Bowers,452
the actual conduct for which Robin Shahar is being punished by hay-
judge's ruling. Telephone Interview with Ruth Harlow, ACLU counsel for Shahar (Apr. 19,
1993).
447 See Shahar v. Bowers, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668, 668 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 1992)
(order denying motion to dismiss).
448 See Mark Curriden, A.G. Refuses to Hire Lesbian, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 32.
449 Id.
450 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 32, Shahar
(No. 1:91-CV-2397-RCF).
451 Id. at 32 (quoting Bowers Deposition at 80-81).
452 Even if Shahar and her partner are sexual, which I admit is a reasonable assumption, it
does not necessarily follow that they are violating the Georgia statute. The Georgia statute
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ing her job withdrawn is not sexual conduct. Rather, she is being
punished for her religious celebration of a personal relationship, her
choice to share a name with her life partner, and her decision to com-
municate her name change to her employer. Because religious liberty
and intimate association are involved, Shahar can argue that this par-
ticular act of anti-gay discrimination infringes upon fundamental
rights. Because opposite-sex couples are not fired when they celebrate
their unions in a church or synagogue, the state's treatment of Shahar
directly burdens her religious liberty in a discriminatory fashion.453
Whether the Shahar court will recognize a Jewish lesbian marriage
ceremony as a fundamental right remains to be seen. Nor is it clear
that the court would then find that Bower's decision to revoke the
offer of employment was a sufficient burden on this right to require to
the application of the compelling state interest test.454 Shahar appears
to be a strong case for fundamental rights analysis, particularly on the
religious liberty claim,4 55 but her success on the substantive due pro-
cess claim should not depend solely on whether the court elects to
apply the compelling interest test. Rather, litigants such as Shahar
should make substantive due process claims about their liberty inter-
ests regardless of whether these interests fit within a recognized cate-
gory deemed fundamental. Intimate association and private
celebrations of relationship, whether religiously motivated or not, are
important personal liberty interests worthy of constitutional review
when the state interferes with them. Meaningful judicial review
would require the court to question the rationality of the state's inter-
ference even if the compelling state interest test is found to be
inapplicable.
does not prohibit all forms of sexual conduct between same-sex partners. See infra text
accompanying notes 416-18.
453 See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding that interracial marriage
raised equal protection and fundamental liberty issues).
454 Although the fact of the marriage (as evidence of sodomy) appears to be a suffcient
motivating factor in Bowers' decision, it is not clear whether he is opposed to the religious
nature of the wedding.
455 Shahar's claim is considerably strengthened by the fact that her lesbian marriage
resulted from her "sincerely-held religious beliefs." See Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment on the Religion and association Claims at 4-5,
Shahar (No. 1:91-CV-2397-RCF) (citing Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1987),
to support her claim).
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Substantive due process arguments can be useful whether or not
they bring victory to the parties making the arguments. Plaintiffs like
Padula should testify in detail about what it means to be a "practicing
homosexual," emphasizing those aspects of lesbian intimacy and
affection that have nothing to do with the sexual conduct prohibited
by the Georgia statute in Hardwick. And plaintiffs such as Shahar
should testify in detail about commitment, relationship, and celebra-
tion to counter the state's emphasis on sodomy as the central activity
of lesbian lives. Failure to make such arguments leaves the court free
to equate "practicing homosexual" with sodomite, an equation that
contributes to the "conduct is status" dilemma and unfairly simplifies
the rich complexity of lesbian and gay lives.
Marc Fajer has argued that lesbian and gay rights litigators should
rely more heavily on equal protection arguments because such argu-
ments will allow us to tell lesbian and gay stories about relation-
ships.456 He is less enamored of privacy arguments because they
"necessarily focus on sex." '4 57 Although I understand his reluctance
to ask the current federal judiciary to focus on sex, I disagree with his
conclusion. I, too, want to bring lesbian and gay stories about rela-
tionships into the courtroom. But I worry about the assimilationist
nature of equality arguments.458 Substantive due process arguments
would allow us (lesbians and gay men) to argue independently about
the value of intimate association, construction of self through rela-
tionship, and the authenticity of lesbian and gay love. We could tell
our stories of relationships in our own terms without forcing them to
sound just like everyone else's.
Moreover, it is not certain that substantive due process claims
focusing on conduct are doomed to fail. Although the current
Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the list of fundamental
rights for purposes of due process analysis, pre-Hardwick decisions
were willing to give some form of heightened scrutiny to homosexual
due process claims.459 If litigants continue to argue that the interests
at stake are important, even if they are not "fundamental," then per-
haps substantive due process claims would begin to enjoy a form of
456 Fajer, supra note 396, at 649 n.802.
457 Id.
458 1 have expressed this concern elsewhere with respect to sex discrimination issues. See
Patricia Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 803 (1990).
459 See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
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"active" rational basis review similar to that available for equal pro-
tection claims.460 In this event, the bifurcation of conduct and status
would become meaningless. Lesbians and gay men would be entitled
to meaningful judicial review of state action that discriminates against
them under both the concepts of due process and equal protection
regardless of whether the state justified its discrimination on the basis
of an individual's status or conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, current lesbian and gay rights litigation must contend
with Hardwick and try to litigate around it. In arguing around Hard-
wick, litigators are relying more heavily on equal protection argu-
ments and distancing themselves from issues of sexual conduct. This
approach is sensible as a pragmatic, short-term strategy until Hard-
wick is reversed. But to the extent this approach rejects the centrality
of sexual and affectional conduct to sexual identity, it presents certain
difficulties. I have suggested that litigators combine substantive due
process claims with their equal protection claim in order to argue for
constitutional recognition of the important aspects of lesbian and gay
lives apart from sodomy.
The post-Hardwick shift in focus by litigators from individual lib-
erty to equal rights mirrors the general shift in the movement away
from the original concept of "gay liberation, '461 towards a more con-
servative concept of "gay rights." By gay liberation, I mean a com-
mitment to the deconstruction of the categories homosexual and
heterosexual as those categories have been constructed by dominant
forces in society.462 In order to challenge those categories, gay and
lesbian liberation, in its early years, sought to protect and validate the
460 See supra notes 370-76 and accompanying text.
461 See supra text accompanying notes 180-88. Compare this experience with that in
Canada, which has also experienced a shift from radical to conservative in its gay movement.
See Gary Kinsman, The Regulation of Desire 13 (1987).
462 As one activist explained:
I will tell you what we want, we radical homosexuals: not for you to tolerate us, to
accept us, but to understand us. And this you can do only by becoming one of us. We
want to reach the homosexuals entombed in you, to liberate our brothers and sisters,
locked in the prisons of your skulls.... We will never go straight until you go gay. As
long as you divide yourselves, we will be divided from you-separated by a mirror trick
of your mind.
Epstein, supra note 182, at 253.
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creation of gay and lesbian identity, as constructed by gay and lesbian
persons. To the extent sexual expression in private, free from state
regulation, was necessary to that creation process, gay liberation
sought to protect the process. Because sexual freedom was at the core
of gay liberation, a legal theory that bifurcated sexual conduct from
personal identity would have been useless to its goals.
Because sodomy challenges were about the validity of intimate sex-
ual expression, they were consistent with the early movement message
of gay liberation. A sodomy challenge argument, informed by gay
liberation, would focus on the identity-affirming aspects of intimate
sexual conduct,4 63 whether that conduct was gay or not. Legal argu-
ments, informed by gay liberation, would talk openly about sex.
Post-Hardwick legal arguments, however, encourage lawyers to
talk about homosexuality without talking about sex. Although it is
true that gay men and lesbians as a class are more than the sex that
they do, there is a certain degree of absurdity to making legal argu-
ments in favor of gay and lesbian rights that ignore sex.
The conduct/status distinction contributes to this absurdity by pre-
tending that status can be successfully bifurcated from conduct.
Bifurcating sodomy from status is one thing. Hardwick requires that
bifurcation. But there are other sorts of conduct, both sexual and
affectional, untouched by Hardwick. Litigators who adopt the con-
duct/status approach to gay rights cases should be careful not to erase
completely this other sort of conduct from their clients' stories. I
have argued that litigators should make substantive due process argu-
ments that focus on this "other conduct." Otherwise, the post-Hard-
wick emphasis on status will de-emphasize the importance to gay men
and lesbians of what is most important in their lives: the love and
affection they feel for their partners.
463 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and American
Public Health Association in Support of Respondents at 2, 15, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (arguing that "[s]exuality is an important element in the lives and
relationships" of couples, that "sex functions as a complex bond," and that the ability to
engage in various types of sexual activity is "important to the psychological health of many
individuals"). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project et al. at 3, Hardwick
(No. 85-140) ("Amici for respondents assert that the need for love is natural, and that the
determination to express and receive love of a sexual nature by engaging in sexual activities
with another adult of the same gender is ... within the range of medical and psychological
normalcy.").
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